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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
General Aviation serves an important role in transportation and 
1n the Nation's economy. But operating procedures are compli-
cated, regulat10ns are restrictive, and the demands of the 
Nat10nal Air Traffic Control (ATC) system are increasing. All of 
these factors contribute to an increasing dependence on avionics 
and to a corresponding increase in their cost and complexity. 
Furthermore, such diverse considerations as safety, rising fuel 
costs, and the des1re to improve single pilot IFR operation will 
stimulate the demand for even more avionics. 
To date, the avionics industry has been able to meet the increas-
ing requirements for avionics at affordable prices by aggressively 
applying new technologies. The application of new technology has 
been along traditional lines, however, with integration occurring 
only in a few spec1fic areas such as nav1gation/communication sys-
tems and 1ntegrated flight director/autopilot des1gns. Using 
this approach, the addition of more sophisticated capabilities 
such as a performance computer, a pilot alert system, or a ground-
proximity warning system -- is expensive and cumbersome because 
of the need for separate computers, separate displays and controls, 
and signals from aircraft sensors that either do not have an ap-
propr1ate output, or are not easily access1ble. However, as a 
result of recent developments in microprocessors, bus1ng, displays, 
and software technology, 1t may be poss1ble to configure an inte-
grated avionics system that 1S better sU1ted for accommodating 
these future requ1rements. 
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In 1975, a research and development program was initiated within 
the National Aeronautlcs and Space Admlnistration to determlne 
the feaslbillty of developing an integrated avionics system suit-
able for general aviatl0n in the mld-1980s and beyond. The ob-
jective was to provide information requlred for the design of 
reliable lntegrated avionlcs. This aVl0nlCS was to provlde ex-
panded functlonal capability that would slgnlficantly enhance the 
utility and safety of general aviation at a cost commensurate 
with the general aviation market. 
The program has emphasized the use of a data bus, microprocessors, 
electronic displays and data entry devices, and improved functlon 
capabillties. As a final step, a Demonstration Advanced Avionics 
System (DAAS) capable of evaluating the most critlcal and promis-
ing elements of an integrated system will be designed, built, and 
flight tested in a twin-engine general aVlation aircraft. 
A contract was awarded to Honeywell, Inc., teamed with King Radio 
Corp., in August 1978 for the design and fabrication of DAAS. 
The specific objectives were (1) to fabricate an integrated avi-
onics system based on the information obtained in the investiga-
tions described in the foregolng paragraph (2) to incorporate in 
thlS system a set of functional capablllties that will be bene-
ficial to general aviation, and (3) to design the dlsplays and 
controls so that the pilot can use the system after minimum train-
ing. The system wlll be installed in the Ames Research Center's 
Cessna 402B in the early part of 1981; engineering fllght testing 
wlll begin at King Radio in Olathe, Kansas, ln mid-1981. Fllght 
tests at Ames Research Center are expected to start in late 1981. 
During the flight tests, guest pilots from various segments of 
the general aviation community will be invited to evaluate the 
DAAS concept. 
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The DAAS Program also includes definition and analysis of a pro-
jected Advanced Avionics System (PAAS). PAAS extrapolates the 
DAAS concept of 1ntegrated, fault tolerant avionics to a poten-
tial operational version for the m1d-1980s. PAAS was analyzed to 
determine reliability, cost, etc., and 1mpact of the DAAS concept 
in comparison to conventional architecture. The results are con-
ta1ned herein. 
This report documents the DAAS Program Phase I System Design, and 
includes the following: 
• DEMONSTRATION ADVANCED AVIONICS SYSTEM (DAAS) 
- DAAS Functional Description 
- DAAS Hardware Description 
DAAS Operational Evaluation 
- DAAS Failure Modes Effects Analysis 
• Project Advanced Avion1Cs System (PAAS) 
- PAAS Description 
- PAAS Reliabi11ty Analysis 
- PAAS Cost Analys1s 
- PAAS Maintainabi11ty Analys1s 
- PAAS Modular1ty Analysis 
• Conclusions and Recommendat10ns 
Addit10nal deta1led des1gn 1nformation 1S conta1ned in the follow-
ing documents: 
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• 'Demonstration Advanced Avionics System (DAAS) Functional 
Description,' 15 October 1980, NASA CR-152405, by Honeywell 
Inc. and King Radio for Ames Research Center, NASA. 
• 'DAAS-System Spec~fication (YG 1210),' 20 December 1979, 
Honeywell Specification DS 28150-01. 
• 'DAAS Central Computer Unit (BGl135), ' 3 October 1980, 
Honeywell Specificat~on DS 28151-01. 
• 'EHSI (Electronic Hor~zontal Situation Indicator) JG12D4AA,' 
13 December 1979, Honeywell Specification D538153-01. 
• 'IDCC (Integrated Display and Control Center), DAAS 
HG1052AA,' 13 December 1979, Honeywell Specification 
DS28154-01. 
• 'NASA-Honeywell DAAS Radio Adapter Unit PIN 066-1083-00, ' 
14 September 1979, K~ng Radio Corp. Specification 001-5018-00. 
• 'Software Development Specification For Y61210 NASA DAAS 
Av~onics System,' Honeywell Specificat~on DS28152-01. 
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SECTION 2 
DEMONSTRATION ADVANCED AVIONICS SYSTEM (DAAS) 
DAAS 1S the demonstrator system intended to physically demonstrate 
the character1st1cs of a fault tolerant 1ntegrated avionics sys-
tem 1n a Cessna 402B aircraft. Follow1ng is descr1pt1on of the 
demonstrator system 1ncluding funct10nal description, hardware 
description, documentation of the DAAS operational evaluation 
conducted on the DAAS s1mulator, and documentation of the failure 
modes and effects analysis conducted to verify DAAS flight safety. 
2.1 DAAS FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION 
The DAAS is an integrated system. It performs a broad range of 
general aviation avionics functions using one computer system, 
and shared controls and displays. Following is brief description 
of the DAAS functions, controls and displays, and DAAS architec-
ture. 
2.1.1 DAAS Funct10ns 
• Autop1lot - The autop1lot 1S a dig1tal version of the King 
KFC200 modif1ed for compatibility with DAAS. The basic auto-
pilot modes are: 
- Yaw Damper 
- HDG SEL (Heading Select) 
- ALT, ALT ARM (Altitude Hold, Altitude Arm) 
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- NAV, VNAV Coupled Control 
- Approach Coupled Control 
• Nav1gat1on/Flight Planning - The navigation/flight planning 
funct10n computes aircraft posit1on with respect to an en-
tered fl1ght plan, and blends dead-reckon1ng pos1t10n (as 
determined from a1rspeed and heading) w1th pos1t1on extracted 
from automatically tuned VOR/DME receivers. Functions are: 
- 10 Waypoints, 10 NAVAID Storage 
Kalman Filter Blending 
- Mov1ng Map Display 
• Flight Warning/Advisory System - DAAS includes extensive 
monitoring, w1th warning capability. For example, the DAAS 
system monitors engine performance (MAP, RPM), a1rcraft con-
figurat10n (gear pos1tion, flap posit10n, etc.) with respect 
to flight condition, and ground prox1mity and informs the 
pilot of undesirable situations. Mon1toring includes: 
- Engine Parameter Monitoring Warning 
- Aircraft Configuration Monitoring, Warning 
- A1rspeed and Stall Monitoring, Warning 
- Altitude Advisory Function 
- Marker Beacon Advisory Function 
- NAVAID Identificat10n Monitor1ng 
Autopilot/Flight Director Monitoring 
- BIT Fault Warning 
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• GMT Clock Functlon - The DAAS computer serves as a GMT 
clock. 
• Fuel Totalizer Functlon - Fuel flow is integrated to total-
1ze fuel used. 
• We1ght and Balance Computations - Weight and balance, and 
takeoff cruise performance calculations can be quickly and 
conveniently performed using DAAS controls and displays. 
• Performance Computations - The DAAS system will determine 
fuel and t1me required to fly specific segment distances 
g1ven altitude, temperature, wind data, and engine power 
setting. Performance computation functions are: 
- Takeoff Performance 
- Cruise Performance 
- Fuel/D1stance/Time Computation 
• DABS (Discrete Address Beacon System) ATC Communication, 
Weather Reporting - ATC text messages (e.g., CLIMB AND MAIN-
TAIN 1200 FT) or weather information at destination can be 
commun1cated to the DAAS pilot via DABS data link and dis-
played on the DAAS electronic display. 
• BIT (Built-in Test) - The DAAS system will detect and local-
ize its own faults via BIT. Provisions are also included 
for troubleshooting the DAAS hardware through DAAS controls 
and electron1c displays. 
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• Normal, Emergency Checklists - Normal and emergency check-
lists are stored in the DAAS computer, and are available for 
display at the push of a button. 
These funct10ns are managed via shared controls and d1splays, and 
performed in the common DAAS computer system. 
2.1.2 DAAS Controls and Displays 
The DAAS Cessna 402B aircraft contains 
• Controls and displays necessary to manage DAAS functions. 
• Additional instruments necessary for IFR flight operations. 
• Independent safety pilot instrument installat1on. 
These controls and displays are layed out 1n the 402B control 
panel as indicated 1n Figure 2-1, Cessna 402B Layout. The DAAS 
pilot 1S in the left seat, and the safety p1lot 1n the right seat. 
Electronic displays -- the Electronic Horizontal S1tuation Indi-
cator (EHSI) and Integrated Data Control Center (IDCC) -- are key 
elements of the panel. 
The EHSI presents a moving map display showing a1rcraft position 
w1th respect to desired course. The d1splay 1S a 4.5-inch mono-
chromat1c Ball Brothers 103C CRT raster d1splay un1t. The dis-
play unit has 256- by 256-dot matrix d1splay capab1lity. P43 
phosphor 1S used together w1th an appropr1ate narrow band optical 
filter to allow operation 1n bright sunlight. The EHSI 1S con-
trolled by functional control buttons and a map slew controller. 
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The Integrated Data Control Center (IDCC) 1S the p110t's pr1mary 
means of 1nteracting with DAAS. Included are a keyboard at the 
bottom of the un1t and a set of funct10n buttons along the top. 
The funct10n buttons 1nclude a set of page select buttons wh1ch 
determ1ne the 1nformation that is d1splayed on the IDCC display. 
The IDCC display CRT 1S ident1cal to the EHSI, i.e., 4.5-1nch by 
4.5-1nch Ball Brothers monochromatic unit. The IDCC can d1splay 
16 11nes of 32 characters each. Line spacing 1S 0.25 inch, char-
acter he1ght 1S 0.162 1nch, and character width 1S 0.125 inch. 
The IDCC is 1mplemented with menu select buttons along each side 
of the CRT, or w1th a pressure sens1tive plastic screen overlay 
for touch p01nt menu selection. The alternate approaches can be 
implemented to allow comparison during fl1ght test. 
The DAAS EHSI is surrounded by the convent10nal "T" pattern of 
fl1ght control instruments. 
The ADI used in DAAS 1S the 4-1nch King KCI 310 Flight Command 
Indicator. 
The altimeter 1S an IDC Encod1ng Alt1meter type 519-28702-571. 
An alt1tude alert 11ght is mounted on the alt1meter. 
The rate-of-cI1mb ind1cator prov1des vertical speed 1nformat10n 
to the p110t. The display presents rates of cl1mb, or descent, 
1n feet per m1nute. The face 1S 2-1/4 1nches w1de. 
The King KI 226 RMI d1splays heading and bear1ng to a selected 
VOR stat10n. 
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The DAAS Autop1lot Mode Controller 1S located on the pedestal, 
and the Autop1lot Mode Annunciator 1S located above the altimeter. 
DAAS engine 1nstruments and rad10 stack are centrally located and 
are accessible to the DAAS p1lot and the safety pilot. 
Un1que DAAS sW1tch controls located on the panel 1nclude. 
• NAV l-DAAS/MANUAL Tune (located to the right of the NAV 1 
radio) 
• NAV 2-DAASjMANUAL Tune (located to the r1ght of the NAV 2 
radio) 
• DME TRANSFER (located to the r1ght of the DME) 
• VOR source switch (located to the lower left of the RMI) 
• ILS source sW1tch (located to the lower left of the ADI) 
NAV Receivers can be tuned manually (MANUAL) or automat1cally 
(DAAS). The DME transfer sW1tch allows the DME rece1ver to be 
tuned by either NAV rece1ver 1 or 2. The DAAS pos1tion slaves 
the DME to the NAV receiver being controlled by DAAS. 
The safety p1lot 1nstrument set 1S 1ndependent from the DAAS 
1nstruments, and adequate for safe f11ght with DAAS 1noperat1ve. 
The safety p1lot's P1ctor1al Nav1gation Ind1cator d1splays a1r-
craft magnetic heading (gyro-stab1lized), selected heading and 
selected course. Also, VOR and localizer course deviat10n, 
g11deslope deviat10n and a TO-FROM 1ndication are presented. 
12 
The safety pilot's KG-258 art1f1c1al hor1zon 1S an a1r dr1ven 
un1t. It 1S the safety pilot's bas1c attitude/horizon reference 
lndlcator. 
Alrcraft master power controls are centrally located overhead. 
Clrcult breakers are located on the pedestal. 
2.1.3 DAAS System Architecture 
DAAS system archltecture lS presented in Figure 2-2. The archi-
tecture lS characterized by a modular computer system structure; 
1.e., multlmicroprocessors lnterconnected by an IEEE 488 data bus. 
Each processor block in Figure 2-2, except for the radio system, 
represents an Intel 8086 16-blt microprocessor, 2k by 16 PROM 
memory, and 4k by 16 to 16k by 16 RAM memory. The radio System 
uses the Intel 8048 mlcroprocessor. 
Each processor performs a function, and interfaces directly with 
the subsystems associated wlth that function. At power-on, the 
bus controller Computer CPU-1 takes functl0nal programs from the 
nonvolatlle bubble memory, and sequentially loads each processor 
at the rate of approxlmately 2 seconds per processor. When all 
processors are loaded, the bus controller activates the system. 
The bus controller then manages bus communications durlng normal 
operations. 
A portable TI Sllent 700 cassette unit can lnterface with the bus 
controller to allow load or modlflcations of the functional soft-
ware. 
CC-CPU 5 lS a spare processor. If processor CC-CPU 3 or CC-
CPU 4 falls and the bus controller detects the failure, 
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F1gure 2-2. DAAS System Architecture 
the bus controller will load CC-CPU 5 wlth appropriate software 
from bubble memory, and CC-CPU 5 will take over the function of the 
failed processor. (Note This reconfiguration c~pability is 
especially important when an EHSI and an EADI are included in the 
PAAS system. With a failure in one display, the spare processor 
could be loaded to allow tlme sharing of the remaining good dlS-
playas both EADI and EHSI.) Such reconfiguration could be ex-
tended to other processors such as CC-CPU 2, the autopilot. How-
ever, for such reconfiguratlon the spare processor must interface 
with autopilot subsystems, which requires additional multiplexing 
of hardware. Reconfiguration was thus applied only to a limlted 
degree in this demonstrator system. 
The DAAS arch1tecture 1S modular. Functlons can be added by add-
lng necessary standard processor modules onto the 488 data bus, 
and interfaclng these processor modules with the devices associ-
ated with the new functl0n. 
SlX processors are contalned ln the DAAS Central Computer Unlt. 
One processor lS contained in the IDCC, and one processor is 
contalned in the radio adapter unit. 
2.2 DAAS HARDWARE DESCRIPTION 
DAAS system components, and their lnterconnectlons are deplcted 
ln Flgure 2-3, DAAS System Dlagram. Interconnection between the 
DAAS panel lnstruments, sensors, and the DAAS computer system is 
shown. The DAAS Central Computer obtalns data from the radio sys-
tem (radlo adapter unlt, radio stack), flight control sensors, 
engine instruments, configuration status sensors, and IDCC. 
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F1gure 2-3. DAAS System Diagram 
Funct10nal computations are performed on the input data and the 
results appl1ed to EHSI, FDI, warning/caut1on l1ghts, and auto-
p1lot servos. 
Follow1ng is a descr1ption of new design DAAS flight hardware 
1nclud1ngo 
• Central Computer Units 
• IDCC 
• EHSI 
• Rad10 Adapter Unit 
The hardware 1S shown in Figure 2-4. 
2.2.1 Computer Control Unit (CCU) 
The CCU, Figure 2-5, consists of the following computer process-
1ng units (CPUs) and their associated I/O interfaces: 
• Autopilot CPU 
• Bus Controller CPU 
• EHSI CPU 
• NAV CPU 
• DABS CPU 
• Spare CPU 
In add1t1on, the CCU conta1ns a one mega-b1t bubble memory and 
the regulated power supplies for the DAAS system. 
2.2.1.1 Mechan~cal -- The CCU is packaged in a full ATR Chassis. 
The dimensions of wh~ch are g~ven in the installation drawing 
17 
Figure 2-4:. DAAS Flight Hardware. From left to right: 
Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator, 
Central Computer Unit, Radio Adapter Unit, 
and Integrated Data Control Center. 
18 
Figure 2-5. DAAS Central Computer Unit 
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shown 1n Figure 2-6. The chassis has been constructed to accept 
up to twenty-three 6.25 by 6.25 1nch card assembl1es plus four 
larger 10 by 6 1nch card assembl1es. All 1nterconnect1ons of the 
card assembl1es are V1a a w1rewrap mother board. 
2.2.1.2 CPU and Memory -- Each CPU has been designed to f1t on 
a s1ngle pr1nted C1rcu1t board card assembly as shown 1n F1gure 
2-7. A CPU cons1sts of the 8086 m1croprocessor, 4K by 16 of RAM 
memory, 2K by 16 of UV-EPROM, an 8259 programmable interrupt con-
troller, and the IEEE-488 bus interface circuitry. In addition 
to the 8086 microprocessor IC, the processor also conta1ns an 
8284 clock generator, bus buffer logic, and memory chip select 
IOglC. 
To facilitate software development, the 8086 is mounted 1n a 
quick-eject socket. Th1S allows easy replacement of the 8086 
with an in-c1rcuit emulator (ICE-86). The 8086 1S operated at 
4 MHz by driving the clock generator with a 12 MHz crystal. Th1s 
clock frequency was selected to be compta1ble w1th the ICE-86 
Wh1Ch has a max1mum llmit of 4 MHz. 
The 8259 programmable interrupt controller provides the capability 
for eight vectored interrupts. The IEEE-488 bus ut111zes the 
highest pr10rity interrupt with the rest of the interrupt 11nes 
connected to spec1al functions assoc1ated with each processor. 
The IEEE-488 bus 1nterface 1S 1mplemented w1th 9914 GPIB adapter 
and two bus transcelver ICs. The 9914 is a 40-p1n LSIC that can 
be programmed to be a talker/11stener or as a bus controller while 
meet1ng all of the reqU1rements of IEEE-488. This feature of the 
9914 allowed all of the CPUs to be designed ident1cally. Communi-
cat10n between the 8086 and the 9914 is carried out via memory 
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mapped reg1sters. There are 13 reg1sters w1th1n the 9914, 6 of 
wh1ch read and 7 write. These registers are used both to pass 
commands or data to, and to get status or data from, the device. 
There are 4K of RAM memory and 2K of UV-EPROM ava1lable on the 
CPU card assembly. An add1t10nal 4K or 8K of RAM memory is 
available with the memory expansion card assembl1es. Memory ex-
panS10n card assemblies are provided for the autopilot, EHSI, 
NAV, and spare CPUs. Also provided on the memory expansion card 
assembl1es is the I/O address decoding logic associated with that 
CPU. From a software standpoint, all of the I/O addressing is 
treated as memory mapped. 
2.2.1.3 CCU Bubble Memory System -- A Rockwell bubble memory 
system 1S used for the nonvolat1le storage of the CPU software 
programs. The bubble memory system, Figure 2-8, consists of two 
card assembl1es, a 1-megabit memory assembly (RLM 658), and a 
controller assembly (RCM 650). The RLM 658 assembly provides the 
1-megab1t of storage via four 256K-bit (RBM 256) devices which 
are operat1ng 1n parallel. The RLM 658 also contains the sense 
amplifiers, coil drivers, operator logic (transfer, replicate and 
generate pulses), and the chip mapp1ng PROM. The chip mapping 
PROM conta1ns the redundancy 1nformation on the good and bad 
loops 1n each of the REM 256 devices. The RCM 650 controller 
organ1zes the memory to appear as an 8-bit byte parallel opera-
tion with 128-byte blocks. Thus the memory is addressed by 
blocks (1 to 1024) w1th 128 bytes per block. The RCM 650 uses 
a preprogrammed 6502 microprocessor to accompl1sh the controller 
funct10ns. Also, 1ncluded on the RCM 650 is a 1k by 8 buffer 
memory which is the ma1n interface between the bus controller CPU 
and the bubble memory. 
23 
Figure 2-8. DAAS Bubble Memory System 
2.2.1.4 CCU Cassette Interface -- Tape cassettes are used for 
1n1tially load1ng the bubble memory w1th the software programs 
for all of the CPUs. A PROM program in the bus controller CPU, 
allows the bus controller to read the ASCII data from the cas-
sette, convert 1t to b1nary, and transfer the b1nary data to the 
bubble memory. A standard RS-232 interface 1S used between the 
bus controller CPU and the ASR733 data term1nal w1th dual cas-
settes. Th1s RS-232 interface, along with additional bubble 
memory address decoding, is contained on the cassette and bubble 
memory I/O card assembly. 
2.2.1.5 Display Controller -- Two ALT 512 graphics display con-
trollers are used to generate the v1deo s1gnal for the EHSI. Each 
ALT 512 conta1ns 1tS own 131,021-b1t refresh memory, TV sync, and 
v1deo generator. The display f1eld for each ALT 512 cons1sts of 
two 256 by 256 by 1 planes. The two-plane arrangement allows 
eight d1fferent d1splay formats. The mode of operation selected 
for the EHSI is to d1splay one plane while the EHSI CPU erases 
and updates the other plane. Two ALT 512s are requ1red to 1n-
crease the throughput on the EHSI. The display 1nformation that 
requires faster updating 1S programmed in one of the ALT 512s 
wh1le the slower 1nformat10n, which is updated at a slower rate, 
1S programmed 1n the other ALT 512. The two ALT 512s are operated 
w1th one as the master, and the other as the slave (1.e. the slave 
receives its video clock and sync t1m1ng from the master). The 
combined v1deo output 1S then transmitted to the EHSI CRT monitor. 
The ALT 512 ut111zes a standard S-100 bus for all of the I/O 
1nterfaces. In order to prov1de the reconf1gurat10n capab111ty 
of letting e1ther the EHSI CPU or the spare CPU drive the EHSI, 
the multiplex1ng of the address, data, and control lines from 
these CPUs to the ALT 512s must be prov1ded. This multiplexing 
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c1rcuitry is provided on the memory expanS10n cards assoc1ated 
w1th those CPUs. Control of which CPU is dr1ving the EHSI comes 
as a d1screte output from the bus controller CPU. 
2.2.1.6 CCU DABS Interface -- Both the standard message (SM) 
1nterface and the extended length message (ELM) 1nterface have 
been implemented for commun1cation between the DABS transponder 
and the DABS CPU. The SM 1nterface cons1sts of a gated clock 
controlled by the transponder, and a bidirectional data line for 
ser1al transm1ssion of data. For up-11nking of information, 
data received from the transponder 1S converted from serial to 
parallel and stored in a 16 by 8 buffer memory. Upon rece1pt of 
a complete COMM-A message, an interrupt is generated to the DABS 
CPU which causes this CPU to read the contents of the buffer 
memory. For down-11nk informat10n, the reverse process 1S re-
qU1red. The DABS CPU loads a 16 by 8 buffer memory and then sets 
the B-bit 1n the SM interface format. Upon receipt of a COMM-B 
message to the transponder, the data is converted from parallel 
to serial and transm1tted to the transponder. 
The ELM 1nterface 1S a full duplex, synchron1zed ser1al binary 
data 1nterface 1n accordance w1th RS-449. The follow1ng 1nter-
face circuits are provided: 
ST send tim1ng (from transponder) 
SD - send data (to transponder) 
RS - request to send (to transponder) 
CS - clear to send (from transponder 
RT - receive timing (from transponder) 
RD - rece1ve data (from transponder) 
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DM - data mode (from transponder) 
IS - terminal in service (to transponder) 
All of these 1nterface C1rcu1ts are b1polar, balanced c1rcu1ts 
that operate at voltage levels and impedance levels as spec1fied 
1n RS-422. Operation of the ELM 1nterface 1S sim1lar to the SM 
lnterface except that the buffer memory is 256 by 8. Th1S allows 
16 COMM-C or COMM-D segments to be recelved or transmitted as a 
block respectively. The transponder takes care of all the COMM-C 
and COMM-D decoding and downl1nk message lnit1atlon. The circuit-
ry requ1red to lmplement the SM and ELM interfaces is contained 
on the DABS SM card assembly and the DABS ELM card assembly. 
2.2.1.7 ccu 1/0 Interface -- With the exceptl0n of the previously 
d1scussed interfaces, all of the I/O devices (aircraft sensors, 
englne monltors, mode control panels, etc.) lnterfaces dlrectly 
w1th the autop1lot CPU. Th1S I/O 1nterface provides the capabil-
lty for: 
48 d1screte lnputs 
48 discrete outputs 
64 analog lnputs 
16 analog outputs 
CCU Discrete 1/0 -- The discrete lnputs are multiplexed into 
4 words of 12 bltS each before belng read by the autop1lot CPU. 
One of the dlscrete lnput words is reserved for self test (wrap-
around) of the fllght crltical dlscrete outputs. Each discrete 
lnput is slgnal conditioned and prefiltered (0.8 msec. time con-
stant) before belng multiplexed to a comparator to determine ltS 
logic state. 
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The d1screte outputs are organ1zed 1nto 3 words of 16 b1ts each. 
The discretes are stored in three 16-b1t registers wh1ch are 
wr1tten 1nto d1rectly from the autopilot CPU. The outputs of 
these reg1sters are buffered with high voltage open collector 
drivers, thus provid1ng e1ther an open or ground. The maJor1ty 
of the d1scretes are used for annunciat10n and the dr1vers t1e 
d1rectly to 28-volt lamps. The autop1lot clutch engage and the 
auto-trim d1scretes requ1re add1tional drive capab1lity. Th1S is 
provided with a d1screte trans1stor stage added to the regular 
drivers. 
The discrete 1nput circu1try and the d1screte output circuitry 
for 16 of the outputs is conta1ned on the d1screte I/O card 
assembly. The c1rcuitry for the rest of the d1screte outputs 
1nclud1ng the special drivers is contained on the discrete out-
put card assembly. The real-time clock 1S also 1ncluded on th1s 
card assembly. The real-time clock is a counter runn1ng from the 
autop1lot CPU Crystal Controlled Clock. It generates an inter-
rupt 40 t1mes per second to the autopilot, NAV, IDCC, and spare 
CPUs. 
CCU Analog Inputs Four DG 506 16-channel multiplexers are 
uti11zed to allow up to 64 analog 1nputs to be mult1plexed to a 
12-b1t (11 b1ts + s1gn) A/D converter. Each analog input 1S S1g-
nal cond1tioned, scaled, and prefiltered pr10r to the multiplexer. 
The AC signals are demodulated using an LF 198 sample-hold IC 
w1th the sampling synchron1zed to occur at the peaks. A frequency 
to voltage converter is used for s1gnal cond1t1on1ng of the true 
a1rspeed s1gnal. 
The A/D converter and 32 channels of mult1plexing are conta1ned 
on the ADC and MUX card assembly. The A/D converter 1S a 
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successive approx1mation type converter with a converS1on time of 
32 m1croseconds, includ1ng multiplex and settl1ng t1me. The con-
verter 1S composed of a 562 type DjA converter and two 8-b1t 2503 
succeSS1ve approximation reg1sters. The 1nput scaling 1S setup 
such that ±10 volts at the input to the AjD converter corresponds 
to full range. The add1t10nal 32 channels of mult1plex1ng is 
conta1ned on the DC Inputs and MUX card assembly. 
Also contained on this card assembly is the signal conditioning 
(differential buffer amplifiers and prefilters) for the dc inputs. 
The ac input card assembly contains a Scott-T transformer for con-
verting the heading synchro slgnals to sin and cosine, second-
order prefilters for the p1tch and roll attltude signals, and the 
demod amplifiers for convertlng these ac signals to dc. The yaw 
servo amplifier, the pitch and roll command bar amplifiers, the 
VNAV dev1ation indicator drive circuitry, and the true airspeed 
frequency to voltage converter are also conta1ned on th1S card 
assembly. 
ecu Analog Outputs -- Each analog output cons1sts of an LF 198 
sample-hold which 1S updated from a 12-b1t DjA converter. Of the 
16 analog outputs prov1ded, 8 are used for 1nfl1ght recording, 3 
for the pitch, roll, and yaw servo amplifiers, 1 each for pitch 
command bar, roll command bar, and VNAV deviat1on, and the other 
two are spares. The DjA converter is a 562 type that is operated 
in the bipolar mode with a signal range of ±10 volts. The DjA 
converter, 16 sample-holds, i6-channel decod1ng, and the pitch 
and roll servo amps are all contained on the DAe and Servo Amp 
card assembly. 
2.2.1.8 ecu Power Suppl1es All power for the eeu and the IDee 
is generated from the a1rcraft +28 Vdc bus. An Abbott BN1000 
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power module is used for the +5-volt supply. Th1S dc-to-dc con-
verter uses a pulse width modulated 1nverter sW1tching at 18 to 
20 kilohertz to achieve an eff1c1ency up to 70 percent w1th out-
put capab111ty to 20 amps. Sim1larily, an Abbott BBN500 power 
module prov1des a dual output ±15-volt supply. Th1s supply has 
an output current capacity of 1.67 amps on each output. The 
bubble memory and the ALT-512 requ1re ±12 V dc Wh1Ch 1S supplied 
from a 11near regulator operating from the ±15-volt suppl1es. All 
of these suppl1es require approximately 10 amps from the 28-volt 
bus. 
2.2.2 Integrated Data Control Center (IDCC) 
The IDCC, Figure 2-9, consists of two basic assemblies. the CRT 
mon1tor assembly, and the chaSS1S assembly. The over-all d1men-
sion of the IDCC are shown in Figure 2-10. The CRT mon1tor assem-
bly is mounted in the IDCC chassis assembly which, in turn, is 
mounted in the aircraft. 
2.2.2.1 CRT Mon1tor Assembly -- The CRT monitor assembly 1S a 
standard, sol1d state, monochromatic televis10n mon1tor des1gned 
for avionics display appl1cations. The mon1tor is 7.7 inches 
wide, 6.0 inches high, by 11.0 1nches deep. It is a raster type 
mon1tor capable of 525 lines w1th a 2:1 1nterface at 30 frames 
per second, or a non-interlaced 262-11ne f1eld at 60 f1elds per 
second. The latter 1S used in this application. The mon1tor 1S 
des1gned w1th P-43 phosphor and a narrow bandpass opt1cal f1lter 
to produce a sunl1ght readable d1splay. The d1splay area 1S 4.5 
by 4.5 inches. 
2.2.2.2 IDCC ChaSS1S Assembly -- The IDCC chaSS1S assembly con-
tains the following subassembl1es 1n add1t1on to the CRT assembly. 
30 
Figure 2-9. DAAS Integrated Data Control Center 
(IDCC) 
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• CPU and memory 
• Keyboard 
• Pushbutton switches 
• Touchpo1nt sW1tches 
• Miscellaneous controls 
IDCC CPU and Memory -- The IDCC contains its own central pro-
cessing unit (CPU) and associated memory. The CPU is an 8086 -
16-bit m1croprocessor. The memory consists of 16K by 16-bit RAM 
and 2K by 16 bit ROM. The RAM 1S used for both program memory 
and scratchpad memory, and the ROM 1S used to store the 1n1t1al-
ization programs. The CPU, together w1th 4K of RAM and the bus 
1nterface circu1try, 1S packaged on one card. A second card con-
ta1ns 8K of RAM. A third card contains 4K of RAM. The fourth 
card contains the CRT refresh memory and the I/O circuitry. 
The CPU, together with its memory, performs the following 
functions. 
• Message storage. 
• Message formatting. 
• Output of messages to display refresh memory. 
• Scanning of switches and touchpoints. 
• Outputting and receiving 1ntercommunications with the 
Central Computer Unit over the IEEE 488 bus. 
IDec CRT Refresh Memory -- Since the CRT monitor has no memory, 
1t must be re-refreshed at the 60-Hz field rate. A CRT controller 
c1rcuit is used to accomplish this function. This circuit accepts 
data from the CPU defining the alpha-numer1c characters to be 
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displayed on the CRT display. It then outputs the approprlate 
vldeo signals to the mon1tor to d1splay these characters at the 
60-Hz field rate. The d1splay f1eld cons1sts of 16 11nes of 32 
characters. 
IDCC SWltch Scannlng -- The IDCC provldes for scann1ng of the 
switches and touchpoints on the IDCC as well as the sW1tches on 
the EHSI. The sW1tches on the IDCC cons1st of the pushbutton 
switches (mode and page select) located across the top of the 
IDCC, the keyboard sW1tches, the forward and back page switch, 
the message acknowledge switch, and the light touchpo1nts. The 
switches on the EHSI conslst of the n1ne sWltches used for EHSI 
control, and the eight switches used for slewlng the d1splay and 
cursor. The sW1tches are scanned and debounced using IC hardware. 
The results of the scanning are entered lnto the CPU V1a memory 
mapped I/O and vectored 1nterrupts. 
IDCC Keyboard -- The IDCC keyboard is mounted at the lower 
left corner of the IDCC. It projects outward and downward at 
approximately a 30-degree angle for ease of operat1on. The key-
board consists of 20 keys arranged 1n a four horlzontal by f1ve 
vert1cal matrlX. 
It should be noted that the keyboard has full alpha-numerlc capa-
billty. Numerlc entry requires only pressing one key. Alpha 
entries, however, require two key entry. Each key has three 
alpha characters ln addit10n to the one numeral. The alpha char-
acters are entered by f1rst presslng the key wlth the trlad of 
alpha characters that includes the des1red character and then 
pressing one of the post des1gnation keys, 1n the bottom row, to 
select left, m1ddle, or right alpha character of the trlad. 
34 
The keyboard is back l1ghted for night operat1on. 
Pushbutton SW1tches The IDee has 18 pushbutton sW1tches 
located across the top to the un1t.- In the current mechan1zat10n, 
14 of the 18 pushbuttons are used. 
The pushbuttons are backl1ghted for night operat1on. One push-
button (AUTO SEQ SEL) incorporates a green l1ght indicator. The 
green light 1S on when the auto-sequence mode 1S on. 
IDee Touchpo1nts -- The IDee incorporates touchpo1nts that are 
used to interact with the eRT d1splay. There are eight touch-
points arranged 1n two vert1cal columns of four each. The touch-
point sW1tches are implemented 1n two different configurations. 
The normal touchpo1nt configurat1on is implemented with e1ght 
indiv1dual switches located in the bezel of the eRT display. 
An alternate touchpo1nt conf1guration can be installed by remov-
1ng the sW1tch mounting bezel and replacing it with a plastic 
overlay. Th1S overlay 1ncorporates a touchpo1nt matrix that can 
be activated by f1nger pressure on the eRT face. The touchpoints 
in th1s conf1gurat1on are also located 1n two columns of four 
each. 
The two d1fferent conf1gurat1ons are electrically compatible and 
interface to the system thru a chassis mounted convertor. 
IDee 488 Bus Interface -- The IDee commun~cat~on w~th the cen-
tral computer un1t is over the IEEE 488 bus. The bus interface 
module (BIM) used 1n the IDee is the same as that used in the 
central computer. It util1zes the TI 9914 488 bus controller Ie. 
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IDee Power Requ1rements -- The eRT monitor port10n of the IDeC 
requires 60 watts maximum of 28 volts dc power, 28 VDC. The 
chassis portion of the IDee requires approx1mately 2 amps of +5 
volts dc. The only other power requ1red by the IDee 1S the 
sW1tch light1ng power der1ved from the 28-volt dc. 
2.2.3 Electron1c Hor1zontal S1tuat10n Ind1cator (EHSI) 
The EHSI, Figure 2-11, consists of two bas1c assemblies - the eRT 
monitor assembly and the EHSI controls assembly. The overall 
dimensions of the EHSI are shown in Figure 2-12. 
2.2.3.1 EHSI eRT Monitor Assembly -- The eRT monitor assembly is 
1dential to the IDee eRT monitor assembly. For a deta1led descr1p-
tion of the eRT monitor assembly refer to paragraph 2.1 of th1s 
report. 
2.2.3.2 EHSI eontrols Assembly -- The EHSI controls assembly 
consists of a face plate, n1ne pushbutton control sW1tches, and 
a slew control switch subassembly. 
EHSI Pushbutton Switches -- The current mechanizat10n uses 
eight of the n1ne ava1lable pushbutton switches. The pushbutton 
switches are wh1te 11ghted for night v1ewing. In addit10n, green 
11ghting 1S prov1ded for mode annunc1at10n. The head1ng-up/ 
north-up map or1entat10n select switch and the map slew or cursor 
slew select sW1tches are split legend annunc1ators. E1ther the 
top half or bottom half may be l1ghted green to 1ndicate the mode 
selected. All other sW1tches are full legend annunc1at10ns. 
Since the map return 1S a momentary mode, the green annunc1ator 
1S not used on th1s switch. 
36 
Figure 2-11. DAAS Electronic Horizontal Situation 
Indicator (EHSI) 
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All sW1tch actions are momentary. The mode latch1ng 1S done 1n 
the IDCC CPU. As d1scussed in paragraph 2.2.2.2, these sW1tches 
are scanned by the IDCC CPU. The IDCC CPU also controls the 
annunc1ator 11ght1ng. 
EHSI Slew Control SW1tch -- The slew control sW1tch cons1sts 
of a single lever operating 11ght sW1tch. The lever 1S mechan-
1cally constra1ned so that either horizontal or vert1cal movement 
only is allowed. The lever is spring loaded to the center off 
position. The lever actuates one or two switches in each of the 
four directions, up, down, left, or right. The first sW1tch 
activation causes a slow slew1ng effect, the second causes a fast 
slewing effect. 
2.2.3.3 EHSI Power Requirements -- The CRT mon1tor portion of 
the EHSI requires 60 watts maximum, 28-volts dc power. The con-
trol switch portion requires only the signal level scanning power 
from the IDCC CPU. Nighttime lighting and annunc1ator llghting 
power for the sW1tches is derived from the IDCC. 
2.2.4 DAAS Rad10 Adapter Un1t (RAU) 
The following funct10ns are performed by the RAU, F1gure 2-13. 
- Tune the radios as commanded by the DAAS computer 
- Process VOR/LOC/CS data from NAV 2 and NAV 2 
- Process station 1dent1f1ers 
- Process DME distance 
- Generate a rad10 system status word 
- Format the data for block transfer 
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Figure 2-13. DAAS Radio Adapter Unit (RAU) 
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- Exchange informat~on with the DAAS computer v~a the 
IEEE 488 bus 
In add~t~on to ~nterfac~ng w~th the rad~o units, the RAU also 
interfaces with --
- 28-V dc a~rcraft power 
- KMA 24 aud~o panel (w~th KA 35A) 
- KCI 310 ADI (through ILS source switch) 
- KI 226 RMI (through the VOR source switch) 
- DME channeling sw~tch and ILS source switch 
- DAAS/Manual status switch for each NAV receiver 
The DAAS system RAU uses a m~croprocessor system for a flexible 
interface for control and data process~ng. The interface ex-
changes data on the 488 bus using standard talker/l~stener func-
tions and handshaking protocol. Also, the system monitors the 
radios, retain~ng and refreshing a def~ned data block for the 
data exchange process. 
The processor sends the proper tuning commands to the radios, 
processes the rece~ved pos~tion data and transfers th~s data in 
block format to DAAS. The data block transfers occur at a fixed 
rate of approx~mately 20 updates per second as required by the 
bus controller. 
The rad~o adapter un~t w~ll exchange data over the IEEE 488 bus. 
A ded~cated general purpose ~nterface buffer (GPIB) w~ll handle 
the standard talker/listener protocol for transferring data. 
Data w~ll be stored in a buffer to elim~nate slowing down the 
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processor. Bus setup t1me is < 45 ~s and data transfer rate 1S 
~ 15 ~s per byte. 
NAV 1 and NAV 2 provide a v1deo compos1te with e1ther VOR or LaC 
lnformation modulated onto the 9960-Hz subcarrier. The interface 
c1rcuit 1dent1fies what type of 1nformat10n 1S present, demodu-
lates the compos1te, and d1git1zes the result. The VOR/LOC data 
from NAV 1 and NAV 2 can also be d1splayed on the KI 226 and the 
KCI 310 1ndicators. The spec1f1c display mode 1S a funct10n of 
the status switches. 
Glideslope information is also ava1lable from the KN 53 Nav1ga-
t10n Receivers. The signal w1ll be cond1t10ned in the 1nterface 
for d1gital converS1on. The d1g1t1zed data w1ll then be processed 
and ma1nta1ned 1n the data block for transfer to DAAS. As w1th 
VOR/LOC, glldeslope information can also be displayed on the KCI 
310 Indicator. The program w1ll select the nav1gat1on un1t to be 
displayed when 1n the DAAS mode. 
To validate active channels of the nav1gat10n rad1os, the 1denti-
fiers will be read electron1cally, converted to the ASCII equ1va-
lent of the recelved Morse code, and stored as part of the data 
block. 
The similar1ty in tun1ng procedure for the KN 53 and KY 196 allows 
a common method of tuning these radios. The interface slmulates 
the act10ns of the front panel rotary knobs by closing lncrement/ 
decrement switches electronically to change frequency. The 
standby frequency only 1S affected by the tun1ng sW1tches. To 
change the act1ve channel, standby 1S turned to the selected 
frequency, and an act1ve/standby exchange is executed. The approx-
1mate worst case tun1ng time for a KY 196 or KN 53 to sweep full 
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band is 250 m1ll1seconds. To execute an act1ve/standby exchange, 
approx1mately 50 mill1seconds 1S requ1red. The hardware for 
tuning the KY 196 rece1vers is included in the RAU, but not the 
necessary software. 
The KN 62A can be tuned by DAAS NAV 1 or NAV 2 through a common 
bus. Then the DAAS mode of tuning is enabled at the DME, one of 
these three sources w1ll supply the DME tun1ng data. The DME 
channel1ng switch then enables the desired tuning source. The 
KN 62A tuning format is the 2 by 5 code. Approximately three 
seconds are requ1red to tune the KN 62A and acquire valid 
d1stance. 
To ver1fy the auto tuning funct10n, or to read the DME channel, 
data is read from the internal tune bus. Th1S data 1S serial BCD 
information. A sync and clock are available to strobe th1S data 
into the interface. 
The following switches are used by the pilot for radio system 
mode selection: 
NAV 
NAV 
DME 
ILS 
VOR 
1 
2 
Source 
Source 
Manual/DAAS 
Manual/DAAS 
NAV l/DAAS/NAV 2 
NAV 2/DAAS/NAV 2 
NAV 2/NAV 2 
Complete pilot backput 1n a manual mode of operation is assured 
by the Manual pos1tion of the switches. 
Range informat1on from the KN 62A is 18 bits of serial BCD data. 
A synchronous clock 1S prov1ded to shift the data into the inter-
face for process1ng. The microprocessor w1ll convert this data 
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to a 15-bit b1nary word (LSB = 0.02 NM) and mainta1n the current 
distance code in the data block. 
2.3 DAAS OPERATIONAL EVALUATION 
P1lot evaluat10n of the DAAS funct10nal conf1gurat10n has been 
conducted on the DAAS fl1ght s1mulator, F1gure 2-14. Extens1ve 
refinement of the functional configuration has resulted. Follow-
ing is a description of the simulator evaluation program and the 
evaluat10n results. 
2.3.1 Summary of Results 
A simulator program was conducted w1th the object1ve of deter-
mining areas where system 1mprovement might be accompl1shed. 
Specif1c system 1mprovement proposals were 1dent1f1ed and dis-
cussed by the s1mulator p1lot subjects and the DAAS system eng1-
neers. Changes were defined based on both their des1rab111ty and 
the1r effect on DAAS complex1ty. 
System 1mprovements are those changes which would enhance the 
operational acceptab1lity of the DAAS pilot/system interface. An 
iterative approach to the simulator program allows the ver1fica-
t10n of the DAAS funct10nal performance, 1nclud1ng 1mprovements 
as they are defined. 
S1mulator program change proposals were Judged 1n 11ght of the 
over-all obJect1ves of DAAS, i.e., 1mprove the safety and depend-
ab111ty of general aV1at1on IFR operations without 1ncreasing 
p1lot prof1c1ency requ1rements or the cost of the aV10n1CS. 
44 
Figure 2-14, DAAS Simulator 
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Two General AV1at10n pilot evaluations were conducted dur1ng the 
development of DAAS prior to this report. In add1t10n, NASA 
Research Pilot Gordon Hardy exam1ned DAAS frequently dur1ng DAAS 
development. 
The f1rst evaluat10n was conducted 1n October 1979. Three 
General Aviat10n pilots part1cipated. The three pilots were. 
J. Lindberg, Instrument Fl1ght Train1ng, a DiV1S10n of Van Dusen; 
R. Albertson, representing King Radio; and W. Unternaehrer, 
Honeywell Avionics Engineering. All three have airline type 
pilot ratings, although they have never flown for an airline. 
Two p110ts, Lindberg and Albertson, are designated FAA Flight 
Examiners. Pilot participant experience is described in Section 
3.1 of this report. 
A four hour system brief1ng was conducted followed by one hour of 
simulator t1me for each evaluation pilot. Follow1ng th1s exposure 
to the system, a four hour debr1ef and discussion was conducted 
on all functions examined in the simulator. Comments were favor-
able, and a number of DAAS features were cons1dered excellent. 
For example, the capability of map slewing and automat1c waYP01nt 
generation received h1gh rat1ngs. The evaluation results were 
positive for the most part, though some concerns were pointed out. 
An example of a concern was the effectiveness of touchpoint data 
entry both on the ground and during flight. The problem centers 
around inadvertent entries and concern for d1fficulty mak1ng data 
entr1es dur1ng flight turbulence. 
There were th1rty-five pilot comments made regard1ng suggest10ns 
for improvements to the DAAS. Many of these have subsequently 
been incorporated. 
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The second evaluat10n was conducted on March 1980. Four General 
AV1ation p1lots part1c1pated. The four p1lots were D. Rodgers, 
K1ng Rad10; R. Albertson, King Radio, W. Unternaehrer, Honeywell, 
and Larry Peterson, Honeywell. A deta1led br1ef1ng was per-
formed. The p110ts then flew a scenario (see paragraph 2.3.2, 
scenar10) 1n the s1mulator wh1ch requ1red 1nput of 1n1t1al data, 
nav1gat10n data, checkl1sts, 1nteract10n with EHSI and autop110t. 
Man Machine SC1ence specialists monitored each p110t in h1s per-
forming the scenario. Questions and comments of a human engineer-
1ng nature were recorded. Following the flights each pilot filled 
out a questionnaire. The combination of close mon1tor1ng dur1ng 
the scenar10 flight, the questionna1re data, and 1ndividual pilot 
debriefs provided comprehensive evaluation of the DAAS. This in-
formation has been assessed and the results are d1scussed 1n 
section 3 of th1s report. 
The evaluation part1c1pants were generally enthus1ast1c about the 
DAAS concept and functional configuration. Access to data was 
considered to be significantly enhanced. Navigat10n, w1th stored 
data base and map display, was considered to reduce p110t work-
load and improve p110t capab111ty in the term1nal area. DAAS 
capab1lit1es to support good pilot pract1ces 1n we1ght and bal-
ance computat10ns and take-off performance computat10n, as well 
as DAAS prec1se nav1gation capability, were Judged to potent1ally 
improve general aviat10n flight safety. 
Evaluators generally agreed that (1) DAAS type systems can pro-
v1de greatly expanded functional capab1lit1es, and (2) m1nimizing 
complex1ty and optim1z1ng the p1lot system interface 1S a maJor 
challenge. 
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2.3.2 S1mulator Descript10n 
2.3.2.1 General Purpose Fac111ty -- The DAAS s1mulator 1S a 
general purpose facil1ty cons1st1ng of the follow1ng pr1mary 
components: 
• Data General Ecl1pse S/200 CPU 
• Data General Nova 3/12 CPU 
• 16-bit parallel DMA between above CPUs 
• Datel System 256 Hybrid I/O Unit w1th 32 D/A and 64 A/D 
channels 
• Discrete I/O with 16 1nputs and 16 outputs 
• Megatek MG552 Graph1cs Generator Un1t 
• Pace 231R Analog Computer 
The Nova 3/12 CPU and Megatek graph1cs unit generate mult1plexed 
alphanumer1c and graph1c formats w1th assoc1ated blank1ng s1gnals 
to drive two independent d1rect-draw CRT displays. Other digital 
s1mulation tasks and hybrid I/O are performed by the Ecl1pse S/200. 
2.3.2.2 DAAS S1mulat1on Hardware -- The fixed base mockup of the 
p1lot's control station includes seat, 1nstrument panel, fl1ght 
controls, and eng1ne controls conf1gured to the approximate d1men-
sions 1n a Cessna 402. S1nce outs1de visual scene generation was 
not available, only IFR flight cond1tions were slmulated. 
Functional Controls -- The following pilot controls are func-
tlonal in the s1mulator· 
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• Ailerons and Elevator -- Spring centered control wheel w1th 
hydraulic dampers on each axis. 
• Rudder -- Spr1ng centered pedals. 
• Elevator Electric Tr1m Switch -- On control wheel. 
• Flap Posit10n. 
• Autopilot Mode Control King KMC 340. 
• Control Wheel Steering Switch -- On control wheel. 
• Autop1lot Dump Switch -- On control wheel. 
• Go-around SW1tch -- On left throttle gr1p. 
• Throttle -- Left lever functional. 
• RPM -- Left lever funct10nal. 
• M1xture -- left lever funct10nal. 
• Gear SW1tch. 
• IDCC Touch Panel -- Eight touch points. 
• IDCC Funct10n select Keys -- 18 keys. 
• IDCC Alphanumer1c Keypad -- 15 keys. 
• IDCC Enter and Backspace Keys. 
• EHSI Cursor Slew Control 
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Functional D1splays -- The follow1ng p1lot displays are func-
t10nal: 
• FDI -- King KCI 310 
• EHSI 
• IDCC 
4 x 5-inch d1rect draw CRT (Tektron1x Mod. 608) 
4 x 5-1nch d1rect draw CRT (Tektron1x Mod. 608) 
• RMI -- King KI 581 
• Mode Annunciator -- King KAP 315 
• Airspeed Indicator -- 2.75-inch meter with 250-deg. pointer 
range 
• Baro Altimeter three pointer DC servo drive 
• Vertical Speed 250-deg, 2.75-inch meter 
• Manifold Pressure - 250-deg, 2.75-1nch meter 
• RPM -- 250-deg, 2.75-inch meter 
• Fuel Flow -- 250-deg, 2.75-1nch meter 
• Aircraft Clock 
• Master Caut10n and Warning L1ghts 
The KI 581 Rad10 Magnet1c Indicator, listed above, 1S s1m1lar 
1n appearance to the KI 226, and was recommended by King Rad10 
for use in the s1mulator. Simulated IDCC and EHSI displays dif-
fer from the 4.5-1nch-square displays w1th 1n-raster symbol gener-
ation presently planned for use in DAAS. The simulator fac1l1ty 
1S currently l1m1ted to d1rect-draw d1splay generat10n. Tektronix 
608 Mon1tors approximate the planned for use in DAAS. The S1mu-
lator fac1lity 1S currently l1mited to direct-draw d1splay gener-
at10n. Tektron1x 608 Mon1tors approx1mate the planned DAAS d1s-
play dimensions to within 0.5 inch, and can be dr1ven by the X, 
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Y, Z, and blank1ng outputs produced by the facility's existing 
graph1cs generator un1t. 
Installation of one K1ng KY 196 Comm Transce1ver and a KT76A 
Transponder in the slmulator is 1ncluded to prov1de the means for 
exerc1sing these functions 1n the pilot's procedural sequence. 
Labeled paste-ups of all rema1ning ind1cators are included on the 
simulated 1nstrument to demonstrate DAAS and backup pilot pane~ 
layouts. 
Simulator Hardware Interfaces -- Figure 2-15 summarized inter-
faces between the facility computers and control/d1splay dev1ces. 
The analog computer 1S used only for gain and null settings on 
proportional controls and DC-meter panel instruments. 
2.3.2.3 DAAS Simulation Software -- Software was developed 
for digital simulation of the following system and environmental 
components: 
• A1rcraft and engine 
• Flight control system 
• Mean wind and gusts 
• Ground nav1gat1on 
• Navigation algor1thms 
• Sensor outputs 
• IDCe funct1ons, pag1ng and display formats 
• EHSI display formats 
• System fa1lures and other unplanned events 
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D1g1tal Program Descr1ption -- The d1g1tal program is d1v1ded 
1nto a set of modules or subroutines, all sharing a common data 
base. Th1S data base consists of two arrays' one real array 
cons1st1ng of up to 1000 real variables, and the second an 1n-
teger array consisting of up to 500 1nteger or logical var1ables. 
Each element of the arrays 1S equ1valenced to a mneumon1C of SlX 
letters or less. The following software subrout1nes are 1ncluded. 
ARPLN -- A1rcraft equat10ns of motion 
LACL Lateral axis control law 
PACL P1tch aX1S control law 
ENGIN Eng1ne model 
MODSL Mode select logic 
ADC -- Analog to dig1tal converter 
SERVO 
DISIO 
SNMOD 
Servo model 
Discrete input/output processing 
Sensor model 
ALTHLD -- Alt1tude hold model 
NAVCM Navigat10n computations 
SERIO Ser1al 1nput/output processing 
IDCC - IDCC d1splay processing 
EHSI -- EHSI d1splay processing 
INSTR -- Instrumentation slgnal processing 
All subrout1nes are called by an executive routine which also 
controls system t1ming by ut1lizing an interrupt dr1ven real t1me 
clock. 
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2.3.3 Pilot Evaluat10ns 
Several indices were used to assess the pilots' responses to the 
DAAS system s1mulat10n. These 1ncluded observat10n of the p110ts 
dur1ng the actual simulat10n exerc1se, as well as a paper-and-
penc11 quest10nnaire and informal debr1ef1ngs follow1ng each ses-
sion. The comb1nat10n of these evaluat10n techn1ques Y1elded a 
relatively comprehens1ve assessment of the p110ts' 1mpress10ns of 
DAAS. These results are presented 1n sect10n 4 of this report. 
In addition to evaluat1ve data, the pilots were also asked to 
prov1de general background 1nformation. Each pilot was asked to 
fill out a br1ef quest10nna1re outlin1ng h1S preV10US flight h1S-
tory and current credent1als. Appendix A conta1ns the subject 
prof1les that were comp1led from the completed quest10nna1res. 
2.3.4 Evaluation Procedure 
The DAAS evaluations cons1sted of four elements. 
1. Pilots were briefed on the DAAS system and the aspects of 
1t that were to be evaluated. 
2. Pilots then flew the simulator follow1ng a scenar10 for a 
planned flight of approximately 15 to 20 m1nutes. 
3. Immediately following the simulator exerC1se, each p1lot 
f1lled out a questionnaire wh1le elaborat1ng verbally 
on the1r responses. 
4. Debrief1ng by means of an 1nformal, on-g01ng d1scuss10n 
with one or more p110ts present completed the evaluat10n 
procedure. 
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2.3.4.1 Brleflng of SubJects -- Brleflngs were given to the DAAS 
evaluatl0n pllots who were not directly assoclated with the de-
sign of DAAS. These briefings emphasized the functional charac-
teristics of DAAS and the partlcular aspects that were to be 
evaluated. 
The brieflngs followed the outline as follows 
1. Objectlves of DAAS 
2. Descriptl0n of Controls and Displays 
2.1 Alrspeed Indlcator 
2.2 Attitude Director Indicator 
2.3 Mode Annunclator Panel 
2.4 Altlmeter 
2.5 Altltude Rate Indicator 
2.6 Electronlc Horizontal Situatl0n Indicator and Controls 
2.7 Engine Instruments 
2.8 Integrated Data Control Center 
2.8.1 Dlsplay 
2.8.2 Touchpoints 
2.8.3 Page Select Buttons 
2.8.4 Navigation Buttons 
2.8.5 Keyboard 
2.9 Caution and Warning Llghts 
2.10 AutOPllot Control Panel 
2.11 Miscellaneous Controls 
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3. 
4. 
2.11.1 Flap Control 
2.12.2 Throttle Quadrant 
2.11. 3 Go Around SW1tch 
2.11. 4 Tr1m SW1tch 
2.11. 5 Autop1lot D1sengage SW1tch 
2.11. 6 Control Wheel Steer1ng SW1tch 
IDCC Functions and Pages 
3.1 In1tialization 
3.2 Weight and Balance 
3.3 NAVAID Data and Storage 
3.4 WaYPo1nt Data 
3.5 Fl1ght Status 
3.6 Take Off and Cruise Performance 
3.7 Check Lists 
3.8 Emergency Procedures 
EHSI Funct10ns and Features 
4.1 Head1ng Indication & Head1ng Select 
4.2 Display Format 
4.2.1 RNAV linked 
4.2.2 RNAV unl1nked 
4.2.3 VOR 
4.2.4 ILS 
4.3 Vert1cal Track Angle and VNAV 
4.4 WaYPo1nt Bear1ng Ind1cator 
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4.5 Miscellaneous Ind1cations 
MDA or DH 
Waypoint in use and ava1lable 
Course 
D1stance to WaYPo1nt 
T1me to Waypoint 
Waypoint Altitude 
Radios in use 
4.6 Heading/North Up 
4.7 Map Scales 
, 
5. Navigat10n Features 
5.1 Map Review 
5.2 Map Slew 
5.3 Map Return 
5.4 Use Button 
5.5 Course Select 
5.6 Auto Sequence 
5.7 Horizontal Direct To 
5.8 VNAV 
5.9 Waypoint Generate 
5.10 Delete WaYP01nt 
5.11 Insert WaYPo1nt 
5.12 Cursor Use 
57 
6. Attitude D1rector Indicator 
6.1 Hor1zon 
6.2 Command Bars 
6.3 Localizer Dev1at10n 
6.4 G11de Slope Dev1at1on 
6.5 VNAV Dev1at1on 
6.6 MDA and DH Indicators 
7. Autop1lot Mode Select Panel 
7.1 Yaw Damper 
7.2 Flight Director 
7.3 Autop1lot 
7.4 Alt1tude Arm, Hold and Tr1m 
7.5 VNAV 
7.6 Heading Select 
7.7 Approach 
7.8 Nav1gat1on 
2.3.4.2 Evaluat10n Scenar1o, Minneapol1s Area -- The evaluat10n 
scenario was planned for approx1mately 15 to 20 m1nutes of f11ght 
starting with a takeoff from the Minneapolis, St. Paul Inter-
national Airport as waYPo1nt 1, hence to waypoint 2, STILS 1nter-
section, hence to waYPo1nt 3, RENEW 1ntersect1on; hence to way-
p01nt 4, BONNA In1t1al Approach Fix for an RNAV approach to Rwy 
29 R1ght, with waYPo1nt 5 the m1ssed approach p01nt located at 
the landing end of Rwy 29 R1ght. Figure 2-16, M1nneapol1s local 
area victor a1rway IFR map, descr1bes the f11ght route. 
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Figure 2--16. 
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The flight t1me of 15 to 20 minutes was of suffic1ent durat10n to 
permit the exercis1ng of the DAAS functions. Preparat10n for the 
flight, the entry of data V1a keyboard 1nto the IDCC such as take-
off performance calculat10ns, we1ght and balance etc., took an 
additional 15 to 20 m1nutes. Thus, the evaluat10n pi~ot was 1n 
the slmulator seat for about 40 m1nutes, Wh1Ch was not long 
enough for e1ther fat1gue or boredom to enter the evaluat10n 
equat10n. 
The NAVAID Data entered into DAAS is described in Table 2-1 and 
cons1sts of the VOR/DME stat10ns used for waypoint def1n1t10n. 
Table 2-2 11Sts the waypoints and describes the vert1cal naviga-
tion profile. Figure 2-17 is the RNAV approach chart for Minne-
apolis, St. Paul, Internat10nal A1rport Rwy 29 Right. 
The following is a description of the scenario in the order of 
actual events. 
1. Rev1ew fl1ght plan as shown in Flgure 2-16. 
2. Power-up system - IDCC INIT PAGE appears. Pilot enters 
zulu tlme (GMT). 
3. Press MENU button and select touchpo1nt WEIGHT & BALANCE 
4. WEIGHT & BALANCE, Pages 2 through 3 - Enter passenger, 
cargo and fuel weight as appropriate. ReV1ew results on 
page 3 to see that the calculated CG 1S between the forward 
and aft 11m1ts and that the maXlmum takeoff we1ght 1S not 
exceeded. Transfer results to INIT page. 
5. Press MENU button and select touchpo1nt TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE. 
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Table 2-1. NAVAID Data for Evaluation Scenario 
NAVAID Frequency Elevat~on Lat~tude Long~tude Var~at~on-No. I.D. 
1 MSP 117.3 880 N4508.7 W09322.4 6E 
2 FGT 115.7 930 N4437 9 W09310.9 6E 
3 N W 
4 N W 
5 N W 
6 N W 
7 N W 
8 N W 
9 N W 
0 N W 
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Table 2-2. Waypoint Data for Evaluation Scenario 
DAAS WaYPo1nt Data Sheet 
NAVAID Elevation CRS1 CRS2 Rad1al D1stance Alt1tude Offset 
WP No ID Frequency (Ft) (Deg) (Deg) (Deg) (NM) (Ft) (NM) RNAV/VOR/ILS MDA 
1 1 MSP 151 0 17 1 
2 1 MSP 094 28 0 3000 4 0 
3 1 MSP In1t1al Approach :0 110 32 0 4000 2 0 -IAF 
4 2 FGT .. 035 13 0 4000 
~, 2 FGT I 352 '~1400 1 6 1400 
6 ~ed Appeoa.b Point MDA 7 (MAP) 
8 
9 
0 
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Figure 2-17. Minneapolis-St. Paul International 
RNAV Rwy 29 Right 
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6. TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE - Enter all appropriate data for take-
off. Rev1ew results of computation on page 2. 
7. Press MENU button and select touchpoint CRUISE PERFORMANCE 
8. CRUISE PERFORMANCE - Enter appropr1ate data for crU1se. 
9. Press NAVAID DATA button - enter VOR/DME data for appropr1-
ate NAVAID stations required to define waypoints for flight 
planned. See Table 2-1 for NAVAID data entry. Press 
NAVAID SUM button to review the data entered. 
10 Press WAYPOINT DATA button - enter waYP01nts that define 
1ntended flight. Review data entered by flipping through 
waYP01nt pages 1 through 5. See Table 2-2 for waypoint 
(WP) data for evaluation scenario. 
11. Using Electron1c Map Slew lever and appropr1ate map scales, 
reV1ew the ent1re flight. 
12. Prepare for takeoff US1ng IDee checklists. 
13. Takeoff; engage auto p110t after airborne; climb to 400 
feet; use heading select to turn for an 1ntercept with 
course 1 of WP2; activate autop110t NAV ARM; and as a1r-
craft couples and settles down on course 1, select auto-
p110t VNAV. Press AUTO SEQ button for course 1 to sW1tch 
automat1cally to course 2. 
14. Halfway to WP3, make WP3 active and press USE button. 
15. Press FLIGHT STATUS button for true a1rspeed, ground speed, 
w1nd, ETA, and fuel available. 
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16. Halfway to WP4, make WP4 active and press USE button. 
17. WaYPo1nt 4 1S BONNA, the init1al approach fix (IAF) for 
approach to Rwy 29 Right. At 3 m1les from WP4, slow air-
craft to 120 kts and reV1ew land1ng checkl1st. See Figure 
2-17, RNAV Approach Chart Minneapolis Rwy 29 Right. 
18. Over WP4, extend land1ng gear and flaps. 
19. Select WP5 MAP active and press USE button. 
20. Mon1tor 1nd1cated a1rspeed to 100 kt and glide slope to 
about 3 degrees on the EHSI Vertical Track Angle 1nd1cator. 
21. At the m1n1mum descent altitude (MDA) the aircraft goes to 
altitude hold and passes over WP5 MAP. End of evaluation 
scenario. 
2.3.4.3 Post-Scenario Questionnaire -- A post-scenario question-
naire was developed to provide quantitative assessment of pilot 
response to the human factors characteristics of the DAAS slmula-
tion scenar10 exercise. Rating scales were used to assess re-
sponses to overall system operation, as well as spec1fic charac-
teristics of the IDCC and EHSI keyboards and displays. The 
questionnaire addressed each of the following areas' 
• Overall System Operat10n 
- Workload assessment 
- Adequacy of informat10n prov1ded 
Relevancy of informat1on provided 
- T1me assessment 
- Potential training requ1rements 
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• Time 
• Method (simulator versus isolated CRT displays) 
• IDCC Keyboard and D1splay 
- Ease of data entry 
• T1me requ1red 
• Keyboard locat1on 
• Keyboard format 
- Adequacy of 1nformation d1splayed 
• Major functions/menu selections 
• Feedback for error corrections 
• EHSI Keyboard and Display 
- Ease of data entry 
• WaYPo1nt 1nsert1on 
• Keyboard location 
- Adequacy of information displayed 
• General Comments 
The post-scenario quest10nnaire was given to each pilot immedi-
ately following the simulat10n exercise. Administration of the 
questionnaire was informal, and verbal comments from the p1lot 
elaborating on the1r responses to each item were encouraged. 
Thus, the quest10nna1re also served as a point of departure for 
the debr1ef1ng discuss10ns wh1ch followed. 
2.3.4.4 Debr1ef1ng -- Debriefing involved informal ongoing dis-
cussion with one or more of the pilots present at any given time. 
Thus, pilots were able to d1scuss the s1mulat10n from several 
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viewpoints. The result was an indepth analysis of both the func-
tlonal characteristics of DAAS and ltS general acceptabillty as a 
future on-board system. 
2.4 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) 
The intention of thlS FMEA lS to analyze the effects of falled 
DAAS elements, the probability of the failures, and how the pilot 
workload and the flight safety situation are affected by the fail-
ures. The importance of the safety pilot is discussed. DAAS 
compatibllity to FAR Parts 23 and 91 lS also assessed. 
Assessment of DAAS compliance with FAR requirements, and analysis 
of fallure effects ln general can be summarlzed as follows: 
• Fallure Effects with Respect to FAR Requirements 
- Of the 86 DAAS elements analyzed, FAR Parts 23 and 91 
VFR and IFR CAT 1 requirements are applicable to 36. 
There are no conflicts for fault-free DAAS. 
- 25 DAAS elements may fall without vl0lating any FAR 
requirements. 
- 11 failed elements vlolate FAR 23.1329.e for the initial 
DAAS design. These 11 failures violate FAR 23.132ge 
WhlCh says' 
"Each system must be deslgned so that a single mal-
functlon will not produce a hardover signal in more 
than one control axis." 
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• 
Recommendat10n -- The FAR 23.1329.e confl1ct was resolved by 
introducing 3 hardware limiters located down stream of the 
pitch, roll, and yaw D/A converters. These limiters will 
proh1b1t any DAAS computer failure from command1ng the 
servos hardover. 
Failure Effects! General -- The 86 DAAS elements were split 
into the 4 fa1lure categor1es: 
22 Elements Category 1, Failure Effects Negligible 
36 Elements - Category 2, Failure Effects Inconven1ent 
26 Elements - Category 3, Fa1lure Effects Demanding 
2 Elements - Category 4, Failure Effects Cr1t1cal 
The two crit1cal fa1lures are Aircraft 28-Vdc and AV10nics 
28-Vdc bus. The category 4 fa1lure probab1lity is very low, 
-6 less than 10 for a 4-hour flight. 
Recommendat1ons 
1. The DAAS fa1lure effects are not critical with the 
exception of the A1rcraft and AV10nics 28-Vdc bus 
fa1lure. The probabil1ty of these fa1lures happening 
1S low enough to make them neglig1ble. No act10n 
requ1red. 
2. Flight safety is dependent on the safety cop1lot. He 
should closely monitor the DAAS performance, especially 
at low altitude, take-off, and land1ng condit10ns. 
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Following are the details of the analys1s includ1ng descr1ption 
of the DAAS system analyzed, assessment of DAAS compliance w1th 
FAR requirements, and description of the FMEA results. 
2.4.1 DAAS System Descript10n 
The present DAAS 1S defined in the follow1ng documents. 
1. Functional description, NASA DAAS Phase 2, dated October 
15, 1980. 
2. DAAS System Spec1f1cat1on (YG1210) preliminary copy 
December 1979. 
3. Software requ1rements for the DAAS FCS, Version 5, October 
1979. 
4. Miscellaneous d1agrams and papers descr1b1ng the Cessna 
402B COCkP1t, servos, etc. 
2.4.2 Assessment of Compl1ance With FAR Requ1rements 
FAR Parts 23 and 91 are applicable to DAAS. The applicable FAR 
paragraphs are restated below and comments given as to how they 
are net by DAAS. 
2.4.2.1 FAR Part 23 Equipment, Systems and Installat10ns -- The 
DAAS, when 1nstalled 1n the a1rcraft, must meet the follow1ng re-
stated FAR Part 23 requirement: 
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Requ1rement, 23.1309 
(a) Each item of equipment, when performing its 1ntended func-
t1on, may not adversely affect 
(1) The response, operat10n, or accuracy of any equ1pment 
essent1al to safe operat1on; or 
(2) The response, operat1on, or accuracy of any other 
equipment unless there 1S a means to inform the pilot 
of the effect. 
(b) The equipment, systems, and 1nstallat1ons of a multiengine 
airplane must be designed to prevent hazards to the airplane 
1n the event of a probable malfunction or fa1lure. 
(c) The equipment, systems, and installat10ns of a s1ngle-eng1ne 
airplane must be des1gned to minimize hazards to the a1r-
plane 1n the event of a probable malfunction or fa1lure. 
Comment. 
The DAAS development program should e11minate adverse affects 
spec1f1ed in item a. Tests 1n s1mulators, qualif1cat1ons tests, 
and checkout in the aircraft shall verify that no undesired 
1nteract10n eX1sts. 
The DAAS design and included l1miters, monitors, warnings, etc., 
sat1sfy the 1tem b or c requ1rements. 
2.4.2.2 FAR Part 23, Requ1rements of the Autopilot -- The Auto-
p1lot (sensors, computer, servos) must meet the FAR Part 23.1329 
requirement as follows: 
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Requlrement, 23.1329 a to g 
(a) Each system must be designed so that the automatlc Pllot can; 
(1) Be qUlckly and positlvely disengaged by the pllots to 
prevent lt from interferlng wlth thelr control of the 
alrplane, or 
(2) Be sufflclently overpowered by one pilot to let him 
control the airplane. 
b, c, g 
a,d,e,f 
Comment-
requires a certaln cockpit design in order to eliminate 
pilot confusion and slmplify use of the autopllot. 
requlres a certain system design to minimize the impact 
of autopllot malfunctl0n. 
The autopilot dump sWltches (control wheel, Nz-accelerometer) and 
the SllP clutch included ln the elevator, aileron, and rudder 
servos provlde the required protection. 
The slip clutches are designed to prevent excessive accelerations. 
Requlrement 23.1329 b 
(b) Unless there is automatic synchronlzation, each system must 
have a means to readily lndicate to the pilot the allgnment 
of the actuating device ln relatl0n to the control system it 
operates. 
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Comment. 
The pos1t10n of the control wheel, pedals and the trim indicators 
ind1cate the al1gnment. 
Requ1rement 23.1329 c 
(c) Each manually operated control for the system operation must 
be readily accessible to the p1lot. Each control must op~r­
ate in the same plane and sense of motion as specified in 
23.779 for cockpit controls. The direct10n of motion must 
be plainly indicated on or near each control. 
Comment: 
DAAS panel layout agrees with the FAR requ1rements. 
Requ1rement 23.1329 d 
(d) Each system must be des1gned and adJusted so that, within 
the range of adjustment available to the p110t, it cannot 
produce hazardous loads on the a1rplane or create hazard-
ous deviat10ns 1n the fl1ght path, under any f11ght condi-
tion appropriate to its use, e1ther during normal operat10n 
or in the event of a malfunction, assum1ng that correct1ve 
action begins w1th1n a reasonable per10d of t1me. 
Comment 
Met by 
1. Software limiters, 3-axis 
2. Software "faders" 1n p1tch and roll 
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3. SllP clutches 
4. Pitch trlm monltor 
5. The Nz> "lG-Dump accelerometer". 
Requlrement 23.1329 e 
(e) Each system must be deslgned so that a single malfunctlon 
wlll not produce a hardover signal in more than one control 
axis. If the automatlc pilot lntegrates signals from auxil-
iary controls or furnished slgnals for operation of other
1 
equipment, posltive interlocks and sequencing of engagement 
to prevent lmproper operation are required. 
Comment: 
This requlrement can be met by lmplementation of hardware servo 
command llmiters. (Note. Llmlters have been added to fllght 
system. ) 
Requirement 23.1329 f 
(f) There must be protectl0n against adverse interaction of 
integrated components, resulting from a malfunction. 
Comment: 
Met by 
1 Buffers ellminating part damage. 
2. Limiters and monltors ellminating exceSSlve commands. 
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Requ1rement 23.1329 g 
(g) If the automat1c p1lot system can be coupled to a1rborne 
navigation equipment, means mHst be prov1ded to 1nd1cate to 
the flight crew the current mode of operat1on. Selector 
sW1tch pos1t10n 1S not acceptable as a means of 1nd1cat10n. 
Comment: 
The annunciator panel prov1des the requested informat1on. 
2.4.2.3 FAR Part 91, Instruments, and Equipment Requ1rements --
FAR Part 91.33, a to e, spec1fies instrument and equipment re-
qU1red for powered C1V1l a1rcraft with U.S. a1r worth1ness cer-
tificates as follows 
91.33 (a) General 
(b) VFR fl1ght, day 
(c) VFR flight, n1ght 
(d) IFR fl1ght, category I 
(e) IFR fl1ght, category above 24,000 feet 
(f) IFR fl1ght, category II 
IFR category II 1S not appl1cable to DAAS. 
The requ1rements are summar1zed as follows. 
Requ1rement 91.33b 
(b) Instruments requ1red for VFR FlY1ng, Day 
(1) Airspeed 1ndicator. 
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(2) Altlmeter. 
(3) Magnetlc direction lndlcator. 
(4) Tachometer for each englne. 
(5) 011 pressure gauge for each englne uSlng pressure 
system. 
(6) Temperature gauge for each 11quid-cooled englne. 
(7) Oil temperature gauge for each alr-cooled engine. 
(8) Manlfold pressure gauge for each engine. 
(9) Fuel gauge lndlcatlng the quantity of fuel In each tank. 
(10) Landlng gear posltl0n lndlcator, lf the alrcraft has a 
retractable landing gear. 
Comment -- The DAAS instrumentatl0n includes the basic lnstruments 
requlred for VFR fllght durlng daytlme. 
Requirement 91.33c 
(c) For VFR nlght flights additional lights and an antlcolllslon 
11ght system are required. 
Comment -- It is assumed that the DAAS aircraft lS properly 
equipped in this respect. 
Requirement 91.33d 
(d) For IFR fllght the followlng lnstruments and equipment are 
requlred. 
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(1) Instruments and equipment specified in paragraph (b) 
of this sect10n and for n1ght fl1ght, 1nstruments and 
equ1pment spec1f1ed 1n paragraph (c) of th1S section. 
(2) Two-way rad10 commun1cat10ns system and nav1gat1onal 
equ1pment appropr1ate to the ground fac1l1t1es to be 
used. 
(3) Gyroscop1C rate-or-turn indicator. 
(4) Slip-sk1d indicator. 
(5) Sens1t1ve altimeter adjustable for barometr1c pressure. 
(6) A cock d1splaY1ng hours, m1nutes, and seconds w1th a 
sweep-second p01nter or d1g1tal presentat1on. 
(7) Generator of adequate capab1ty. 
(8) Gyroscop1C bank and p1tch ind1cator (art1f1cial hor1zon). 
(9) Gyroscop1C d1rect1on 1nd1cator (d1rect1onal gyro or 
equivalent). 
Comment -- The above llsted 1nstrumentat1on are 1ncluded 1n DAAS. 
There 1S no requ1rement on redundancy stated 1n th1S paragraph. 
Requ1rement 91.33e 
(e) IFR fl1ght at and above 24,000 feet MSL. 
If VOR nav1gational equ1pment 1S requ1red under paragraph 
(d) (2) of th1S sect10n, no person may operate a U.S. reg1s-
tered c1vil a1rcraft w1th1n the 50 states, and the D1str1ct 
of Columb1a, at or above 24,000 feet MSL unless that air-
craft is equ1pped w1th approved d1stance measuring equipment 
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(DME). When DME requ1red by this paragraph fails at and 
above 24,000 feet MSL, the pllot ln command of the alrcraft 
shall notlfy ATe lmmedlately, and may then contlnue opera-
tions at and above 24,000 feet MSL to the next alrport of 
lntended landing at WhlCh repalrs or replacement of the 
equlpment can be made. 
2.4.3 DAAS Failure Modes and Effects Analysls Results 
The DAAS FMEA was conducted to determine effects of failures in 
the DAAS hardware. Assumptl0ns for the analysis were as follows: 
• DAAS is deslgned for category I IFR operation 
• All slngle failures and dual failures wlth hlgh failure 
rates are studled. 
• Any fallure ln any element is assumed to result In a lost 
functl0n of that element, WhlCh makes thlS a "worst case" 
analysls. 
• The autopilot slip-clutches, the pllot (and N
z
) dump 
switches, and the pllot and copl1ot overrlde posslbl1ltles 
provlde the pilots adequate means to safely handle any 
slngle control axis hardover servo fallure. 
-6 
• The probabl1lty of a crltlcal s1tuatlon less than 10 ln a 
4-hour flight is Judged to be negllgible. 
• Prefllght test and lnfllght blt are performed. AutOP11ot 
dump sW1tch1ng, normal accelerat10n dump sW1tch, and servo 
clutch switches must be checked. 
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The prefl1ght test coverage w1ll be less than 100 percent 
due to nontestable elements. Expected fault detect10n 
coverage 1S 
Sensors 
Computers 
Ind1cators and Servos 
Monitors, Dump SW1tches, Clutches 
70-80% 
90-95% 
80-90% 
100% 
Some takeoffs may take place w1th faulty system elements due 
to less than 100 percent prefl1ght test coverage. 
• Effective DAAS software val1dat10n will be performed. 
• The four Failure Categor1es are. 
1. Neglig1ble to the p1lot 
2. Inconven1ent to the p1lot 
3. Demand1ng to the p1lot 
4. Critical, evident risk for catastrophe 
Fault categorization assumes a slngle p1lot. In the conclu-
S10ns, Judgments are glven on how the safety p~lot ~mproves 
the DAAS fl~ght-safety s~tuat~on and how fa~lure probab~l~­
t~es affects the DAAS fl1ght safety s~tuat~on. 
• FAR Part 23 and 91 requ~rements are assumed to def~ne a m~n~­
mum av~on~cs system, wh~ch ~s normally safe to fly. 
• DAAS fa~lure rates used ~n the FMEA are as llsted in Table 
2-3. The fa~lure rate is the probability of a fa~lure in a 
DAAS element dur1ng 1 hour flight. 
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Table 2-3. DAAS Elements Fallure Rates 
Elements Type Quantlty Fallure Total Comments No n Rates Rates 
1 DAAS Elements Hardwlred to DAAS-ComEuters 
Bubble Memory 1 500 500 
CPU & RAM/PROM 8086 7 60 420 (20 and 80%) 
Radlo Adapt Box (8748) 1 40 40 
BIM (9914 ) 8 12 96 
488-Bus 1 1 1 Incl 2 Connectors 
A/D, D/A, Mux 1 60 60 
-
EHSI 1 300 300 
IDCC 1 300 300 
IDCC Keyboard 1 50 50 
ADI EC1310 1 340 340 
RMI KZ226 1 330 330 
CX-Sens & Indlc. 1 100 100 
PltOt System L 1 50 50 Not electrlcally hardwlred' 
Encod Altlm -571 1 200 200 
Audlo Cont Panel KMA 24 1 200 200 
Comm Tranceivers KY196 2 330 660 
VOR Recelvers KN53 2 250 500 
DME Recelvers KN62A 1 500 500 
Transponder KT76A 1 400 400 
Mode Controller KMC-340 1 340 340 
Annunclator Panel KAP-315 1 30 30 
MAG X MTR KMT112 1 20 20 
Dlrectlonal Gyro KSGI05 1 330 330 
Slave Control KA-51A 1 10 10 
Vertlcal GYRO VG 208 1 330 330 
Radar Altlmeter RT-271 1 500 500 
ADC KDC-380 1 200 200 
True Alr Speed VA 210 1 100 100 Incl. F/V Converter 
Outer Alr Temp 1 10 10 Incl Sign Condltlonlng 
Yaw Rate GYRO GG 2472 1 50 50 
Englne Map 2 5 10 
Englne RPM 2 10 20 Incl F/V Converter 
Englne Fuel Flow 2 5 10 
Cowl Flap Pas 2 5 10 
Flap Pos 1 20 20 
Elev Trlm Pos 1 20 20 
Yaw Servo 1 70 70 Incl. Clutch & Ampllf 
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Table 2-3. DAAS Elements Fallure Rates (2 of 2) 
Elements Type Quantlty Fallure Total Comments No n Rates Rates 
Roll Servo 1 70 70 Incl Clutch &. Ampl1f 
Pltch Servo 1 70 70 Incl Clutch &. Ampllf 
Pltch Trlm Servo 1 50 50 Incl Clutch &. Ampl1f 
2 DAAS lnstrumentatlon not Hardwlred to DAAS Com;euters 
lAS 1 280 280 Pltot System L 
VSI 1 100 100 Pltot System L 
Turn &. Bank 1 150 150 -
Fuel Quantlty 1 150 150 
Map 1 10 10 
RPM 1 10 10 
Fuel Flow 1 10 10 
EGT 1 10 10 
Englne Status 2 20 40 
3 Co-Pllot Back U;e lnstrumentatlon 
PltOt System R 1 50 50 
lAS 1 280 280 
Altlmeter 1 180 180 
VSl 1 100 100 
Turn &. Bank 1 150 150 
Artlflc Horlzon KG258 1 670 670 
PNI KC525A 1 330 330 
Slave CTRL KA-51A 1 10 10 
Dlrect GYRO KG102-A 1 400 400 
MAG X MTR KMT112A 1 20 20 
Comm Trancelver 422A 1 660 660 
VOR/GS, Recelver 442A/443A 1 500 500 Incl Nav Converter 
4 Electrlcal Power S:z:stem 
A/C 28VDC Bus 1 < 1 < 1 Redundant Alternators 
AVlOnlcs 28VDC Bus 1 < 1 < 1 
pllot dlsconnect faulty 
battery' , 
DAAS A 28VDC Bus 1 - 1 _ 1 Valld as long as DAAS 
DAAS B 28VDC Bus 1 _ 1 _ 1 Battery Lasts (-1 hr ) 
DAAS Battery Chrgr 1 5 5 
DAAS Battery 1 100 100 
DC/AC Invertor 1 10 10 
DC/DC Converter 2 15 30 
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For the fa1lure probabil1ty est1mates, 4 hours flight t1me 
are assumed. 
The fa1lure rates 1n Table 2-3 are collected from adJusted 
MIL-HDB-217B data, vendors rel1abil1ty data, Honeywell pre-
d1cted fa1lure rates and by compar1son to known sim1larly 
complex elements. 
The failure rates should be representat1ve of components and 
parts ava1lable 1n 1979/80. 
FMEA results are compiled in Appendix B. The DAAS elements are 
defined on these forms and the type of fa1lure and the failure-
rates are also llsted. The impact of a faulty element on down-
stream DAAS elements 1S also 1nd1cated. 
F1nally, a Judgment 1S made as to how the failed element will 1n-
crease the p1lot effort required to complete h1S flight. The 
failures are divided into the four categories on the basis of 
this judgment. 
The DAAS fa1lure category is assigned assuming a cO-1lot in the 
r1ght seat. 
Appendix B also 1nd1cates whether: 
• 
• 
• 
FAR requ1rement are appl1cable and met. 
Failure probab1lities are significant to the risk sltuat10n. 
DAAS would be safe to fly w1th the analyzed element faulty. 
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The FMEA covers the consequences of 86 failed DAAS elements. 
Table 2-4 summarlzes fallure categorles and lndlcates whether 
appllcable FAR requlrements are met. Comments on redundancy, 
fallure probablllty, etc., are given for some falled elements. 
These FMEA results lndicate that fault-free DAAS meets the FAR 
Part 23 and 91 requirements. DAAS does provlde the required 
means for override and disengage after a failure. 
FAR requlrements may more or less be Vlolated lf DAAS elements 
fall. Of the 86 failed DAAS elements studled, FAR VFR or IFR Cat 
I requirements apply to 36. For these 36 falled elements, 11 
violate the FAR requirements. FAR requlrements that apply to 
general VFR fllght, and 6 of these are not met. 13 requirements 
applYlng to IFR Cat I, 5 are not met. 16 requlrements apply to 
IFR Cat II; DAAS is not certlfled for Category II. 
The vl0lated paragraph is 23.1329(e) WhlCh says. 
"Each system must be designed so that a single malfunction 
will not produce a hardover signal ln more than one control 
aXls." 
Violatlon occurs for failures In: 
• AlP, NAV, Bus Controller, Processors 
• 488-Bus 
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Table 2-4. Summary of the DAAS Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis 
FaIlure Element Far Req FaIlure Comments No. Met Category 
1 Encod. AltImeter OK Cat 1 3 M1sleads ATC ProXlm1ty W-Error 
2 Alt1meter Co-PIlot OK Cat 2 2 
3 Radar AltImeter OK 2 
4 TAS N/A 2 
5 lAS PIlot OK Cat 1 2 
6 lAS Co-PIlot OK Cat 2 1 
7 ADC (380) N/A 2 M1n. Alt. for ALTH -Recommended 
8 P1tOt System L OK Cat 1 3 
9 P1tOt System R OK Cat 2 1 
10 Oat N/A 2 
11 PIlot Mag XTMR OK Cat 1 3 
12 P1lot Slave Ind1c. N/A 1 
13 PIlot DIrect GYRO OK Cat 1 3 
14 P1lot RMI OK Cat 1 2 
15 Co-PIlot Mag. XTMR OK Cat 2 1 
16 Co-Pilot Slave Ind1c N/A 1 
17 Co-P1lot DIrect GYRO OK Cat 2 1 
18 Co-PIlot PNI OK Cat 2 1 
19 P1lot Turn & SlIP OK Cat 2 1 
20 Co-PIlot Turn & SllP OK Cat 2 1 
21 Yaw Rate GYRO N/A 2 
22 X-Sensor & Ind1cator N/A 2 
23 P1lot VertIcal-GYRO OK Cat 1 2 
24 P1lot ADI OK Cat 1 2 
25 Co-PIlot ArtIf. Horlz. OK Cat 2 1 
26 Map Instrument OK Cat 2 2 
27 RPM Instrument OK Cat 2 2 
28 EGT Instrument N/A 2 
29 Eng. Status 1 OK Cat 2 3 PIlot ActIon 
30 Eng. Status 2 OK Cat 2 3 As 1f EngIne Fa1lure 
31 Fuel Flow Sens. 1 N/A 2 
32 Fuel Flow Sens. 2 N/A 2 
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Fa1lure 
No 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 a 
b 
48 a 
b 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Table 2-4. Summary of the DAAS Fallure Modes and 
Effects Analysls (Sheet 2 of 3) 
Element Far Req. Fa1lure Comments Met Category 
Fuel Quant1ty OK Cat 2 2 
DAAS Map Sensor N/A 1 
DAAS RPM Sensor N/A 1 
W1ng Flp. Pos. Sens. N/A 1 
Elev. Tr1m Pos. Sens. OK 1 Redundant 1nfo. ava1lable 
Cowl Flps. Pos Sens. N/A 1 
-
LDG Gear Pos. Sens. N/A 1 
Door Pos. Sens. N/A 1 
Aux. Fuel Pump Sw. N/A 1 
Cws-Sw1tch & LOg1C OK 3 A Software Controlled CWS L1ght Recommended 
Go-Around SW1tch N/A 3 
P1tch Tr1m SW1tch N/A 2 
P1tch Tr1m Button N/A 3 Runaway Not Mon1tored 
A/P Dump Sw. & Relay OK 3 2 Fa1lures Probab. _10- 1 
Co-P1lot Comm. OK 1 Duplex Probab. _1; 0 10- 6 Trans1evers, Antennas 
Co-P1lot Comm. OK 1 Trans1evers, Antennas 
P1lot Nav. OK Cat 2 2 Rece1ver + Antennas 
Co-P1lot Nav. OK Cat 2 1 Rece1ver + Antennas 
DME Rece1v. + Ant. OK Cat 2 2 S1ngle DME 
Transponder + Ant. N/A 1 No Outs1gnal ATC Problem! 
Aud10 Headsets OK 2 DAAS Duplex 
SW1tch Nav 1 Sel. N/A 2 
SW1tch Nav 2 Sel. N/A 2 
SW1tch DME Sel. N/A 2 
SW1tch VOR Sel. N/A 1 
SW1tch Loc/GS Sel. N/A 2 
IDCC Keyboard N/A 3 M1ssed P1lot Input Check. Low Probab1l1ty 
IDCC Selector SW1tch N/A 2 
IDCC CPU, D1splay N/A 2 
EHSI Selector SW1tch N/A 2 
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Fa1lure 
No. 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
Table 2-4. Summary of the DAAS Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (Sheet 3 of 3) 
Element 
EHSI CPU, D1splay 
Annunc1ator Panel 
Mode Cont. Tr1m/Hdg. 
Mode Cont. Toggle Sw 
Mode Cont. Solen. Sw. 
A/P Yaw Clutch, Servo 
A/P Roll Clutch Servo 
A/P P1tch Clut. Servo 
A/P P1tch Tr1m Servo 
Clutches Common Log1c 
A/P-I/O CPU, BIM 
A/P-I/O A/D, D/A, MUX 
NAV/FLT PLN CPU, BIM 
Spare CPU, BIM 
Rad10 Adapter Box 
and BIM 
Dabs Transponder 
CPU + BIM 
BUS. Controller 
CPU, BIM 
488 Bus 
Bubble Memory 
Cassette 
A/C Ma1n 28 VDC Bus 
Avion1cs 28VDC Bus 
DAAS A-B 28VDC Bus. 
DAAS AC Buses 
DAAS 15V DC Bus 
DAAS 12 DC Bus 
DAAS 5 DC Bus 
Far Req. Fa1lure 
Met Category 
N/A 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
OK 1) 
OK 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
NOT OK 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Comments 
Fault Dur1ng Cr1t1cal 
Fault Phases 
Probab. No Recon. 30-10- 5 
Probab. Recon. 6-10- 5 
Probab. <10- 6 
Cr1t1cal Fault Phase 
ATC Problem 
Uncerta1n Warn. 
Cr1t1cal Fault Phase 
Probab. <10- 6 
Eff1c1ent B1te Probab. «10- 6 
Probab. <10- 7 
Probab. <10- 7 
Probab. <10- 7 
Probab. _10- 5 
Probab. _10- 5 
Probab. «10- 6 
Probab. _10- 5 
1) CESSNA 402B electr1cal power system w1th DAAS 1nstalled 
assumed to meet appl1cable Far requirements. 
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• Bubble Memory and Cassette 
• The E1ectr1ca1 Power Buses 
The 23.1329(e) conf11ct was resolved by 1ntroduc1ng three hard-
ware 11m1ters located 1mmediate1y downstream of the p1tch, roll 
and yaw AjD converters 1n the DAAS hardware. These 11m1ters 
proh1b1t any k1nd of DAAS computer fa11ure from command1ng servo 
hardover. The 11m1ters reduce any DAAS computer hardover failures 
to. 
• Pitch - 60% Full Scale 
• Roll - 30% Full Scale 
• Yaw - 45% Full Scale 
Append1x B conta1ns the complete Failure Modes and effects 
analyses. Eighty-six failures were defined and categorized 
as follows. 
Category 1 - Fa11ures are neg1ig1b1e to the DAAS pilot; e.g., 
cop110t 1nstruments, door sW1tches, etc. 
Category 2 - Fa11ures that cause 1nconvenience to the DAAS pilot, 
e.g., loss of ADC-380 RMI, a -Sensor, Annunc1ator 
Panel. 
Category 3 - Failures dur1ng busy or cr1tica1 flight-phases which 
can be demand1ng to the DAAS p110t, e.g., IDCC key-
board, eng1nejstatus 1nstrument, servos, autop110t 
dump sW1tch, autop110t processor, bus, and electric 
power. 
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Category 4 - Failures that may create a crit1cal s1tuation. The 
two DAAS Category 4 fa11ures a e loss of the A1rcraft 
and Avion1cs 28-Vdc Bus. The probab111ty of occur-
rence 1S very remote. 
Table 2-5 summar1zes the number of fa11ures that fall w1th1n 
these fa11ure categor1es. 
Table 2-5. Failure Categorization of 
the DAAS Elements 
Fa11ure Category 
1 2 3 4 
Number of DAAS 22 36 26 2 
Elements 
The DAAS Category 4 failures have a very low probability of 10-6 . 
They are negligible. 
Autopilot Processor fa11ures are demanding dur1ng especially low 
alt1tude f11ght phases. The probab111ty of such a failure may be 
10-5 for a 4-hour f11ght. It 1S vital to the DAAS flight safety 
that the cop110t closely monitors the DAAS performance dur1ng 
such conditions. 
The DAAS FMEA concludes that, with servo command limiters imple-
mented as recommended, DAAS flight safety 1S adequate for the 
demonstration system. 
The DAAS system meets the obJectives of the program as well as 
the necessary safety requirements. The conclusions and recommen-
dations pertain1ng to the DAAS system are presented 1n Section 4 
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report. The DAAS design and analysls served as a basellne for 
the Projected Advanced Avionlcs System (PAAS), WhlCh is discussed 
In the followlng sectl0n. 
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SECTION 3 
PROJECTED ADVANCED AVIONICS SYSTEM (PAAS) 
PAAS 1S a projected operat10nal version of DAAS. It extrapolates 
the DAAS concept of fault tolerant 1ntegrated aV10n1CS to a sys-
tem that could be produced 1n the m1d-1980s. PAAS 1S designed to 
have super funct10nal reliab111ty. The Autopilot/Nav1gat10n mean 
time between loss of function 1S on the order of 10,000 hours._ 
PAAS can thus provide the dependable pilot relief that is essen-
tial for effective flight management by using the expanded func-
tional capab111t1es prov1ded. 
Following 1S a description of PAAS and an analysis of its reli-
ability, cost, ma1ntainability, and modularity. 
3.1 PAAS SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The PAAS system, Figure 3-1, extrapolates the DAAS concept to a 
mid-1980s projected operat10nal avionics configura~ion. PAAS 
arch1tecture is slmilar to DAAS; 1.e., it 1S a reconfigurable 
multiprocessor conf1guration. PAAS extends the DAAS spare pro-
cessor redundancy concept to cover all essent1al aV10n1CS pro-
cessors. PAAS employs a fault tolerant sensor configuration, 
dual redundant data busses, and dual autopilot servos. Redun-
dancy 1n sensors, data bus, and servos -- 1n addit10n to fault 
tolerant process1ng -- 1S requ1red to cause slgnif1cant 1mpact 
to the aV10n1CS functional rel1ab11ity. 
PAAS is designed as a min1mum cost system that will allow con-
t1nued operation of essent1al aV10nics funct10ns after any single 
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failure. Functional reliab111ty of navigation and autopilot are 
emphas1zed. The PAAS des1gn prov1des approx1mately 10,000 f11ght 
hours of operat10n between loss of these funct10ns, as compared 
to 200 hours for current systems. ~PAAS 1ncludes extens1ve bU11t-
1n test for high confidence fault detection (and annunc1at10n) 
and fault 1s01at10n for eff1c1ent ma1ntenance. 
Follow1ng 1S a descript10n of the PAAS fault tolerant 1mplementa-
tion of sensors, data bus, computer, displays, servos, power 
supplies, and the redundancy management techniques envis10ned for 
the system. 
3.1.1 PAAS Sensor Conf1guration 
PAAS sensors requ1red for nav1gat10n and autop110t funct10ns are 
redundant for fault tolerance. Four skewed laser gyros, and four 
skewed accelerometers are proposed for the proJected strap-down 
attitude head1ng reference system (AHRS). Dual static and d1ffer-
ential pressure transducers are proposed for a1r data sensing. 
Dual VOR receivers and single DME are included for NAV inputs. 
Fuel sensors, engine sensors and configuration monitoring sensors 
are nonredundant. 
Following are details on the unique PAAS AHRS and air data sensor 
mechanization. 
3.1.1.1 PAAS AHRS Mechan1zat10n -- The AHRS employs strap-down 
skewed laser gyros and skewed accelerometers for fault tolerant 
attitude and rate sensing. 
The laser gyro 1S a solid-state, preC1S10n angular rate sensor 
w1th a direct dig1tal output. The laser gyro 1S ideally suited 
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for strap-down system conf1gurat10ns because 1t e11m1nates the 
need for g1mbals, torque motors or other rotating parts. Instead 
of the rotat1ng mass of a convent10nal mechan1cal gyro, the r1ng 
laser gyro ut1l1zes two beams of laser l1ght counter-rotating in 
a closed path. Laser gyro based 1nert1al nav1gat10n and 1nertial 
reference systems are inherently more rel1able and easy to ma1n-
ta1n, and they prov1de the add1t10nal benef1ts of 1nstant on, 1n-
sens1t1v1ty to acceleration error sources, and low l1fe cycle cost. 
Four gyros and four accelerometers are employed 1n a skewed con-
figuration, as shown in Figure 3-2. 
Aircraft body rates (and accelerations) are der1ved from the sen-
sor tetrad as 1nd1cated. The three body axis rate components 
(and accelerat10ns) can be computed from the sensor signals even 
if one sensor has fa1led. Fault tolerance is thus provided for 
the three body rates (and accelerations) w1th only one added 
sensor. 
A faulty sensor can be detected w1th high conf1dence by sensor 
comparison monitoring, and the fault can be isolated to one sen-
sor either automatically, or by pilot selection should the auto-
mat1c selection fa1l as described in paragraph 3.1.7. 
The sensed aircraft rate and acceleration signals are converted 
to digital form 1n each of the PAAS dual I/O terminals and trans-
m1tted to the PAAS AHRS processor for att1tude/head1ng computa-
t10ns. A flux gate signal is also 1nput for long term heading 
reference. The att1tude heading s1gnals are used on the elec-
tron1c att1tude indicator in the PAAS autop1lot and nav1gat10n 
functions. 
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A general aVlatl0n laser gyro AHRS lS not currently avallable, 
but may become feaslble. Honeywell is developlng a laser gyro 
inertlal reference assembly for the Boelng 767. Others are work-
lng on low cost laser rate sensors uSlng optlcal flbers. 
3.1.1.2 PAAS Air Data Sensors -- Dual SOlld state statlc and 
differentlal pressure transducers and dual temperature sensors 
are proposed for PAAS to provlde fault tolerant lnputs for com-
putatlon of altltude, altitude rate, indicated airspeed and true 
alrspeed. Honeywell's solid state transducers used ln current 
commerclal aircraft alr data systems are representative of de-
vices which will llkely make the PAAS air data approach feaslble 
ln general aviation ln coming years. 
The Honeywell pressure sensor converts the applled pressure to a 
usable electrlcal slgnal. An N-type sllicon dlaphragm wlthln the 
sensor contains two P-type resistors dlffused ln an orthogonal 
pattern on the dlaphragm. The orthogonal placement of the reslst-
ors in the dlaphragm creates a change ln the bulk reslstivity of 
the reslstors that lS a functlon of diaphragm tangentlal and 
radlal straln. The trangentlal reslstor (RT ) lncreases reslstance 
wlth straln (applled pressure), while the radlal reslstor (RR) 
exhlblts a corresponding decrease with straln. 
The sllicon plezoresistors are, therefore, used as straln gage 
elements. 
The reslstive elements have nearly ldentical temperature coeffl-
cients of reslstance, because they are formed at the same tlme 
durlng the processing operations and are adJacent to each other. 
ThlS permlts temperature-related errors to be largely self-compen-
sating due to the sensor reslstance-brldge Clrcult mechanlzatlon. 
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Sensed stat1c pressure, differential pressure and temperature are 
converted to dig1tal form and transm1tted to the PAAS ADC proces-
sor for computat10n of altitude and airspeed signals for use on 
electron1c fl1ght 1nstruments, and 1n PAAS autop1lot and nav1ga-
t10n funct10ns. 
3.1.2 PAAS Data Bus 
The PAAS data bus 1S dualized for fault tolerance. One bus con-
troller is located with each I/O term1nal. The two busses oper-
ate continuously to provide dual redundant 1nputs to detect (and 
annunc1ate) faults w1th high confidence. 
DAAS employs the 16-w1re IEEE 488 8-bit parallel data bus. A 
h1gh throughput ser1al data bus, for which LSIC interface compo-
nents are available, is proposed for PAAS. The serial bus would 
be preferable to m1n1m1ze a1rcraft wir1ng if the PAAS processors 
are packaged separately. 
PAAS data bus throughput requirements have not been establ1shed, 
though PAAS data bus loading 1S clearly h1gher than DAAS because 
a1r data, AHRS data, and weather radar d1splay data are added to 
the bus. 
3.1.3 PAAS Computer Architecture 
The PAAS computer employs the spare processor redundancy concept 
developed for DAAS, but extends back-up capability to all essen-
tial processors. See Figure 3-1. The PAAS spare can take over 
for any failed processor except the DABS processor, the weather 
radar processor, or the IDCC processor. 
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The DABS or weather radar function reliability would not be Slg-
nif1cantly enhanced by redundant processing because the h1gher 
failure rate sensors are not redundant. The IDCC back-up is a 
reverS10n mode on the EHSI d1splay, thus IDCC processor backup 
1S not requ1red. 
The PAAS processors rece1ve the1r 1nputs, and supply outputs to 
dual I/O terminals via the dual PAAS data busses. 
3.1.4 PAAS Displays 
Proposed PAAS d1splay configurat10n 1S 11lustrated in F1gure 3-3. 
Three-color CRTs are included. One d1splay normally presents: 
• Attitude/Director Indicator 
• lAS Indicator 
• Altimeter 
• Vert1cal Speed Indicator 
• Etc. 
The second panel mounted d1splay 1S a hor1zontal sltuat10n 1nd1-
cator sim1lar to the DAAS EHSI. A third d1splay would be mounted 
1n the pedestal for use as an IDCC. 
The first d1splay could be per10dically switched to present the 
EHSI if the second d1splay fa1led, and vice versa. The second 
display could also be sW1tched to operate as a pr1m1t1ve NAV 
funct10n IDCC if the primary IDCC fa1led. 
Mult1function controls are prov1ded for each d1splay. The con-
trols are relabeled when the d1splay funct10n changes. 
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Commun1cation control heads are panel mounted to prov1de tun1ng 
capabil1ty independent of the PAAS d1splay system. 
3.1.5 PAAS Servo Mechan1zation 
PAAS servos are dual w1th clutch arrangements to allow sW1tch1ng 
between servos for cont1nued operat1on after one servo fa1lure. 
Each servo in a dual pa1r 1S driven from one of the dual I/O ter-
m1nals. A servo model would be implemented 1n PAAS software for 
each mechan1cal servo, and model output would be compared to 
servo output to detect and isolate servo faults. 
3.1.6 PAAS Power Mechanizat10n 
Dual, monitored power supplies are included 1n PAAS. The power 
references to the essent1al PAAS components are sW1tched 1n event 
of a power supply fa1lure. 
3.1.7 PAAS Redundancy Management 
PAAS would 1nclude extens1ve bU1lt-1n test to detect and 1solate 
faults to facil1tate automatic reconf1gurat1on. Fault detection 
conf1dence could exceed 99 percent for dual elements through use 
of s1mple compar1son monitor1ng. Automat1c fault 1solat1on 1S 
feas1ble with confidence on the order of 80 to 90 percent for the 
dual sensors, and approach1ng 100 percent for the dual model-
comparison-mon1tored servos. 
PAAS could 1nclude capab1lity for manual redundancy management as 
backup to the automat1c fault localizat1on/reconf1gurat1on. The 
PAAS data bus could be sW1tched manually from dual operation to 
Channel I or Channel II as 1ndicated in F1gure 3-3. Sensor and 
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servos could be manually selected on IDCC pages as shown 1n 
Flgure 3-4. 
3.2 PAAS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
PAAS is conf1gured to provide an order of magnitude 1mprovement 
in functional rel1ablllty at a reasonable cost w1th respect to 
conventional archltectures. Effect1veness of the PAAS architecture 
is therefore analyzed by comparing PAAS AUtOP110t and Navigat10n 
function reliabil1ty w1th respect to a hypothes1zed "conventional" 
system. The reliability analysls also compares the maintenance 
failure rate of PAAS and the "conventl0nal" system to give some 
1ndication of PAAS relatlve life cycle cost. 
The "conventional" system component list, and assoc1ated failure 
rates, are compiled in Table 3-1. ThlS system 1ncludes current 
devices requ1red to give functional capability simllar to that of 
PAAS. Communicat10ns, navigat10n, fl1ght control, performance 
computations, configuration monitoring, and weather radar are 1n-
cluded. Where poss1ble, failure rates are King Radio Corporation 
tabulat10ns of actual operational experience. Honeywell Reliabil-
ity Engineering Group prov1ded gener1c estimates where operational 
exper1ence was not ava1lable. The PAAS computer un1t reliability 
prediction is extrapolated from the DAAS hardware mechan1zat10ns. 
The "convent10nal" system maintenance failure rates are summed to 
determ1ne a total fallure rate of 1061.5 percent per 1000 hours, 
for a total system mean time between fa11ure of 94 hours. 
The "convent10nal" system autop110t/nav1gation functional rell-
ability was determined by summ1ng fallure rates of components 
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• RUO SERVO SEL 
> AUTO 
MAN (CH XI 
• AIL SERVO SEL 
> AUTO 
MAN (C" XI 
• EL SERVO SEL 
> AUTO 
MAN (CH XI 
• TR SERVO SEL 
> AUTO 
MAN (CH XI 
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT 
STATUS 
AHRSSEL/CH 
AHRS GynO/ACCEL FAIL 
ADC SELICH 
ADC PSIIAS FAIL 
NAV SELICH 
NAV FAIL 
PAAS Manual Redundancy Management 
PI OF I 
AUTOII 
XIX 
AUTOII 
XIX 
MANII 
Z 
Table 3-1. 
FAILURE 
RATE 
Reliability Estimate for a Conventional 
System 
MAINTENANCE AUTO PILOT INAV 
F\ILURE RATE FUNCTION FAIl URE 
CONTRI BUT ION RATE CONTRIBUTION 
DEVICE (%/1000 H~S) QUANTITY (,/1000 HRS) (%/1000 HRS) CO'IMENr 
NAV/FLT CONTKOL SlNSORS/lNSTRUMENTS 
Yau Rate Gyro 5 I 5 5 
Magnetic Transmitter (KMT 112) 2 I 2 0 Manual slaving assumed if fai led 
DirectIonal Gyro (KSG lOS) 3J I 11 11 
stale Control (KA 51.0\) I I I I 
Vertic"l Gyro (Ve 208) 11 I 11 J3 
Pitot System, Left 5 I 5 5 
Pltot System, Right 5 I 5 5 
Encoding AltImeter (IDC 571) 20 I 20 20 
Air Ddta COt1plJter (KDC 380) 20 I 20 20 
YOR Receiver (KN 53) 25 2 50 2 5 
DM~ Recelver (KN 62A) 50 I 50 -
Angle of Accack Sensor, Ind \0 I 10 -
Turn and Bank 11dieator I> I 15 I> 
o.\T Sensor I I 
-L. -
25G 141 5 
CONTROLS AND DIS'LAYS 
Autopilot Hode Controller (KM(, 340) 34 I 34 34 
Autopilo~ Annunciator PaneL (KAP 31» 3 I 1 3 
ADI (KCI 110) 20 I 20 0 \rtlficial horlZon backup, degraded 
11,,[ (KPI »3) 20 I 20 0 RMI backup, degraded performance 
lUll (KI 226) 33 I J3 0 HSI b3Ckup 
Audlo Control Panel (KliA 24) 20 I 
- 2" -
Failure AnnU,cl<ltor PauLL 3 1 3 -
Air~pee.:l Indu.ator 28 I 28 28 
Artl[ll.Jdl lIu["lzon (KL. 25J) b7 I 9.1.... 0 
228 65 
COMPUTlR. lJ ECTRO~llS 
Autoplol COllIl>ut(.r (t<..\r 325) » I » » 
Flight Computer ( .... CP 320) 85 I 85 85 
RNAV !:'Jstt:m ("-NC 665) 90 I 9a 90 
VNAV CO'uputLr (K~ 395) 45 1 45 4~ 
Perform.lnc(: (.ompllt(.r 20 1 lis. 
295 27> 
perfOrl111DCe 
Table 3-1. RelIabilIty Estimate for a ConventIonal System (Sheet I 2 of 2) 
HA I NTENANCE AUTO Plwr/NAV 
FAILURE FAILURE RATE FUNCTION FAILURh 
"\TE CONTRIBUTION RATE CONTRIBUTION 
D~VICh (7./1000 IIRS QUANTITY ('t/LOJO IIRS) ('t/looO IIRS) CO'IMENf 
.a:~RJQ_~!'ill'..2. 7 I 7 7 
PttLh Servo 7 I 7 7 
RoL L !::lervo 7 I 7 7 
Yaw 5t!["vo 7 I 7 7 
Pll(...h THm ::'ervo 5 I 5 5 
26 26 
.t!V.i'i!.1:Q~ 
MAP ~I..nl>or 0 5 2 I - Not requi red for AutOPllot, NAV funet ion 
RPM !::Jl.m;or I 2 2 -
lowl F'lap PUHtion 5 I 5 -
Flap Po .. itlon 2 I 2 -
ElLvdtor Trim Po~t1on 2 I 2 -
Radar AltlmLter 50 I 50 -
515 0 
.i:!,H IIEK RAOAK 
Tranl>tn! tter/Rec:..I.l ver 50 I 50 - Not requited fOl Autopilo NAV funL[ Ion 
Dl",piay Unlt 5 I 
..l -
55 0 
£Qt1l'.llili~ 
lOllVll Tran'iLt:ivLr!.o (KY 190) 33 2 66 - Not required for AutOPilot, NAV funLt Lon 
DAB> irant-pondLr 40 I 40 -
DABS ConlrollDl!:.play 30 I 30 -
136 0 
.1::1 ~(~!i!.<dtJ:QVli..!2.~ 
All lHVD_ Btllt, Aln .. raft Battery "I I NOT INCLUDED 01 
UliA( 1 nVL rl or I I I I 
DefDC lunvLrtl.r J I J l.-
4 0 4 01 
TOTAL 1056 5 
" 
6 51 
HrBF • 94 6 ilRS 201 IIRS 
requ1red to prov1de these funct10ns. Fa11ure contr1bution of 
dual VOR receivers was cons1dered negligible. The total conven-
tional system autopilot/navigation function failure .rate, assum-
1ng a 1-hour m1SS10n, 1S 496.5 percent per 1000 hours for a mean 
t1me between loss of function of 201 hours. 
Correspond1ng PAAS ma1ntenance re11ab111ty and autop110t/nav1ga-
t10n function reliab11ity are compiled in Table 3-2. PAAS main-
tenance re11ability is 50 percent better than the conventional_ 
system because: 
• H1gh reliab111ty d1g1tal electron1Cs employed 
• H1gh re11ab11ity so11d state sensor technology employed 
• Electronic d1splays replace conventional 1nstruments 
• PAAS 1ntegrated avionics architecture e11minates hardware 
PAAS autopilot/navigation funct10n re11ab11ity 1S 1mproved by a 
factor of 50 with respect to the "conventional" system, primarily 
due to the fault tolerant PAAS architecture. A PAAS gyro, accel-
erometer or a1r data sensor failure can be tolerated without loss 
of a funct10n. A PAAS processor fa1lure, a power supply fa1lure, 
and a servo fa1lure can be tolerated w1thout loss of function. 
This PAAS fault tolerance is accomp11shed w1th the m1n1mum of 
redundant hardware, as descr1bed in section 3.1. 
PAAS would suffer gross loss of function for certa1n fa1lure com-
b1nat10ns. For example, the PAAS conf1gurat10n would be totally 
1ncapac1tated by two 11ke bus controller fa1lures. The probab1l-
1ty of such fa1lures occurring during a 1-hour flight 1S extremely 
low, however; for example: 
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Table 3-2. Reliabi11ty Estimate for PAAS 
r------------------------r--------.-------.---------~------------r_---------------------------1 
DEVICE 
NA V / FL T CONTROL SENSORS 
Magenetic Transmitter (KMT 112) 
Laser Gyro, Interface Electronics 
Acce lerometer. Interface Electronics 
Pitot System, Left 
Pitot System, Right 
Static Pressure Transducer 
Dlf fcrent ia 1 Pressure Transducer 
VOR Receiver (KN 53) 
DME Receiver (KN 62A) 
Angle of Attdck Sensor 
OAT Sensor 
CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS 
Autopilot Mode Controller (KHC 340) 
EAOI Dl.,play, Controls 
Ell" I Display, Controls 
IDCe, Dbplay, Controls 
CO~IPUn.R , EL[CTRONI CS 
Processor (8086, Memory) 
A/D, D/A, MUX 
BubblL Memory ~y~t(.m 
SeRVO ACTUATORS 
P1tch Servo 
Roll Servo 
Your ~Lrvo 
PlC("h Trim ~t!rvo 
FAILURE 
RATE 
('t/1000 HRS) 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
25 
50 
5 
2 
34 
35 
35 
35 
6 
50 
QUANTITY 
II 
MAINTENANCE 
FAILURE RATE 
CONTRIBUTION 
('t/IOOO HRS) 
20 
20 
5 
5 
10 
10 
50 
50 
5 
..1.... 
179 
34 
35 
35 
...ll.. 
139 
66 
12 
..2Jh 
128 
14 
14 
14 
10 
S'2 
AUTO PILOT/NAV 
FUNCTION FAILURE 
RATE CONTRIBUTION 
('t/IOOO HRS) 
o 
2 
2 
1 
1 
o 
-....l. 
7 1 
o 
o 
o 
.Q 
o 
1 8 
6 
o 
24 
o 
o 
o 
o 
ii 
COMMENT 
ManuatfP~o~g ~:~t!ng alignment required 
901 fault isolation capability 8ssumec.. 
901 fault 1801ation capablluy assumed 
901 fault isolation capability assumed 
904 fault isolation capability assumed 
901 fault l.Solation capability asswr.ed 
901 fault isolatioo capability assumed 
Manual switchlng if required 
907. fault isolation capability assu.ned 
IOCC page for backup 
Manual sWltching of display~ 
Manual switchlng of dlsplays 
Basic NAV page avallable on EliSl d1splays 
Autopilot, NAV, ADC, AHRS. RAU. Bus Controller 
processors only 95'7 fault 15olation 
capabiltiy assummed 
9S'1.. fault issolation capablllty assullUlled 
Not required unless .3nother failure occurs 
Servo-model L.omparison monltLrlDg for 
fault isolat10n 
Servo-model compan.son monltor1ng for 
fault lsolat ion 
Servo-model compar1~on man. tonng for 
fault lsolat10n 
Servo-mod(.l (.omparl~on monitoring for 
fault isolat ion 
Table 3-2. Reliab1lity Estimate for PAAS (Sheet 2 of 2) 
MAINTENANCE AUTO PILOT/NAV 
FAILURE FAILURE RATE FUNCTION FA ILURE 
RATE CONTRIBUTION RATE CONTRIBUTION 
D<VICE (%/1030 HRS) QUANTITY (%/1000 HRS) (7../1000 HRS) CO~IET 
.t!1lli.!..IQ.!!2.':.NSOR~ 
I{H 0 ~ 2 1 - Not requi red for AutopiLo .. I NAV funet Ion 
RPM 1 2 2 -
Cowl Flap POSition ~ 1 ~ -
Flap Pus it ion 2 1 2 -
lle ... atot" TrI'n PO'itlion 2 1 2 -
Radar Alt lInetcr (RT 221) ~O 1 ~1. -
~7 ~ "0 
WI ~TIIER ..MIlAR 
Tran~1R ttt:r/RecLilfl:!r 50 1 2l!.... Not reqll1red for Autopilot, NAV funl..t Ion 
~O 0 
m·tll!...!E .. ~'l.:e1\ .. 
(.0.,1111 Trll!>L~ivcrs (KY 190) 33 2 66 -
0.'-\5", Transpnd ... t' ~J 1 !!l... 
106 ~ 
~i_' __ ll_n_ L!~)1 
A" lHV} lIu \1 rcr.J t 
" 
ery 01 1 NOT INCLUDED 01 Pilot di'ienbcl" III nl J b, • V d ~ IIU' ' 
PAAS 8a ttl. ry 10 1 10 0 PAAS Jestgn must operate Without b3ttery 
Ld!>cr Gyro PO\YLr Supp ly 1 1 1 1 
DC/DC Converter 3 2 6, 
-...L 9~% fault lSolation capabl1lty assumed 
17 1 31 
TOIAL 728 ~ 10 8 
NTBF - 137 HRS 9260 Hill> 
2 -8 Dual Fallure Probablllty = (ABC t) = 1 x 10 
where: 
ABC = bus controller fallure rate = 10%/1000 hours 
t = tlme = 1 hour 
The two-failure probability is slmllar to the order of magnitude 
of Milltary alrcraft fly-by-wlre flight control catastrophlc 
fallure rate. 
3.3 PAAS COST ANALYSIS 
PAAS and "conventional" system cost estlmates, complIed in Tables 
3-3 and 3-4, lndlcate that the PAAS costs are slmllar to those 
for a conventlonal system. 
The cost flgures used in the analysis were current Klng RadlO 
catalog prlces where avallable, or rough estimates based on simi-
larity where catalog prlces were not avallable. The PAAS com-
puter cost estlmate lS an approxlmatlon extrapolated from the 
DAAS hardware mechanizatlon. No estlmate lS available for the 
PAAS laser gyro AHRS, so a cost number correspondlng to an electro-
mechanical device was used. Conclusions are not affected even 1f 
this number lS slgnlflcantly lncreased. 
PAAS thus provldes dramatic improvements in functlonal rellability 
wlthout slgnlficantly lncreaslng system costs. PAAS total costs 
are contained because PAAS lS lntegrated and does not require 
dedlcated controls and dlsplays for ltS functlons. 
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Table 3-3. Cost Estimate for a Conventlonal System 
DeVlce 
NAV/FLT Control Sensors 
Yaw Rate Gyro 
Magnetlc Transmltter (KMT 112) 
Dlrectlonal Gyro (KSG 105) 
Slave Control (KA 51A) 
Vertlcal Gyro (VG 208) 
PltOt System, Left 
Pltot System Rlght 
Encodlng Altlmeter (IDC 571) 
Alr Data Computer (KDC 380) 
VOR Recelver (KN 53) 
DME Recelver (KN 62A) 
Angle of Attack Sensor, Ind. 
Turn and Bank 
OAT Sensor 
Subtotal 
Controls and Dlsplays 
AutOPllot Mode Controller 
(KMC 340) 
AutOPllot Annunclator Panel 
(KAP 315) 
ADI (KCI 310) 
HSI (KPI 553) 
RMI (KI 226) 
Audl0 Control Panel (KMA 24) 
Alrspeed Indlcator 
Artlflclal Horlzon (KG 253) 
Subtotal 
Computer, Electronlcs 
AutOPllot Computer (KAC 325) 
Fllght Computer (KCP 320) 
RNAV System (KNC 665) 
VNAV Computer (KVN 395) 
Performance Computer 
Subtotal 
Estlmated 
Quantlty Cost 
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1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
(Dollars) 
1,200 
205 
2,495 
60 
4,303 
4,629 
1,785 
3,730 
3,225 
2,566 
700 
100 
24,998 
885 
520 
5,610 
7,200 
2,205 
675 
170 
1,250 
18,515 
3,035 
4,465 
5,985 
3,305 
14,200 
30,990 
Basls For 
Estlmate 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Estlmate Only 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Table 3-3. Cost Estimate for a Conventional System (Sheet 2 of 2) 
Est~mated Bas~s For Dev~ce Quant~ty Cost Est~mate (Dollars) 
Servo Actuators 
-
P~tch Servo 1 2,140 Catalog 
Roll Servo 1 2,140 Catalog 
Yaw Servo 1 2,140 Catalog 
P1tch Tr1m Servo 1 1 1 665 Catalog 
Subtotal 8,085 
Mon~tor1n~ 
Fa~lure Annunc~ator 1 75 Est~mate Only 
MAP Sensor 2 200 Est1mate Only 
RPM Sensor 2 1,200 Estimate Only 
Cowl Flap Pos1t10n 1 100 Est1mate Only 
Flap Position 1 100 Est1mate Only 
Elevator Tr1m Pos1t1on 1 100 ESt~mate Only 
Radar Alt1meter 1 2 1 350 Catalog 
Subtotal 4,125 
Weather Radar 
Transm~tter/Rece~ver 1 13,000 Spl~t Est~mate 
D1splay Un~t 1 7 1 000 
Subtotal 20,000 
Commun1cat~ons 
Comm Trance1vers (KY 196) 2 3,510 Catalog 
DABS Transponder 1 2,000 Est1mate Only 
DABS Control/D1splay 1 4 1 000 Est1mate Only 
Subtotal 9 1 510 
TOTAL $116,223 
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Table 3-4. Cost Estimate for PAAS 
Devlce 
NAV/FLT Control Sensors 
Magnetlc Transmltters 
(KMT 112) 
Laser Gyro, Interface 
Electronlcs 
Accelerometer, Interface 
Electronlcs 
Pltot System, Left 
Pltot System, Rlght 
Statlc Pressure Transducer 
Dlfferentlal Pressure 
VOR Recelver (KN 53) 
DME Recelver (KN 62A) 
Angle-of-Attack Sensor 
OAT Sensor 
Subtotal 
Controls and Dlsplays 
Autopilot Mode Controller 
(KMC 340) 
EADI Dlsplay, Controls 
EHSI Dlsplay, Controls 
IDCC, Dlsplay, Controls 
Subtotal 
Computer, Electronlcs 
Processor (8086, Memory) 
Power Supply and M1SC. 
A/D, D/A, MIX 
Bubble Memory System 
Subtotal 
Servo Actuators 
Pltch Servo 
Roll Servo 
Your Servo 
Pltch Trlm Servo 
SUbtotal 
Estlmated 
Quantlty Cost 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
11 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
~09 
(Dollars) 
205 
8,000 
800 
800 
3,730 
3,225 
828 
100 
17,688 
885 
7,000 
7,000 
8,000 
22,885 
9,600 
6,000 
2,000 
2,000 
19,600 
4,280 
4,280 
4,280 
3,330 
16,170 
Basls For 
Estlmate 
Catalog 
Estimated of 
basls of cost 
of electromechan--
lcal replacement 
Estlmate Only 
Estlmate Only 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Estlmate Only 
Estlmate Only 
Es"t1mate Only 
Estlmate Only 
Estlmate Only 
Estlmate Only 
Estlmate Only 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Catalog 
Table 3-4. Cost Estlmate for PAAS (Sheet 2 of 2) 
Devl.ce 
Monitor Sensors 
MAP 
RPM 
Cowl Flap Posl.tl.on 
Flap Positl.on 
Elevator Trim POSl.tl.on 
Radar Altl.meter (RT 221) 
Subtotal 
Weather Radar 
Transml.tter/Recel.ver 
Subtotal 
Communl.catl.ons 
Comm Transcel.vers (KY 196) 
DABS Transponder 
Subtotal 
TOTAL 
Estl.mated 
Quantl.ty Cost 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
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(Dollars) 
200 
1,200 
100 
100 
100 
2,350 
4,050 
13,000 
13,000 
3,510 
2,000 
5,510 
$98,903 
Basl.s For 
Estl.mate 
Estl.mate Only 
Estl.mate Only 
Estl.mate Only 
Estl.mate Only 
Estl.mate Only 
Catalog 
Transcel.ver/dl.splay 
Spll.t Estl.mate 
Catalog 
Estl.mate Only 
3.4 PAAS MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSIS 
The proJected advanced Avionics System (PAAS) maintenance test 
concept 1S ~ep1cted in Figure 3-5. Highly effective aV10n1CS 
bU1lt-1n test (BIT) 1S ant1c1pated. On-aircraft funct10nal test-
1ng and fault localizat10n to a module w1th1n an LRU are expected 
to be feas1ble w1th minimal test equ1pment. The fixed base oper-
ator could explo1t the BIT capab111ty and m1n1mize his special 
purpose test equipment and become more a storehouse of replace-
able modules. The avionics should include capability for on-
a1rcraft trouble shooting by the fixed base operator. Faulty 
modules could be repa1red at the factory. 
BIT design obJect1ves consistent with the above maintenance ph11-
osophy are' 
• Minimize f1xed base operator test capability requirements 
• Maxim1ze BIT fault local1zat10n capability 
Of course, the resulting BIT mechan1zation must not signif1cantly 
1ncrease avion1cs cost. 
DAAS BIT modes 1nclude: 
• In-fl1ght test 
• Functional test/fault local1zation - automatic 
• Funct10nal test/fault localizat1on 1nteract1ve 
• Ma1ntenance trouble shoot1ng 
In-flight-test 1S continuous and will generate a warning when a 
detected fa1lure w111 disable a system function. The DAAS will 
automat1cally reconfigure for computer un1t processor fa1lures. 
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Figure 3-5. 
ON AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE 
• FUNCTIONAL TESTING - 95% CONFIDENCE 
• FAULT LOCALIZATION TO LRU - 90% CONFIDENCE 
• FAULT LOCALIZATION TO REPLACEABLE MODULE -
10 - !IO% CONFIDENCE 
• TESTING, TROUBLESHOOTING VIA 10CC 
FIXED BASE OPERATOR 
• ON AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE 
• LIMITED GENERAL PURPOSE TEST EOUIPMENT 
• REPLACEABLE MODULE STOCK 
• IRU STOCK - - - - (LIMITED RENTAL UNITSI 
DEPOT/FACTORY 
• MODULE, LRU ATE 
• STANDARD LRU ATE BUS INTERFACE 
• MODULE, LRU REPAIR 
• SPARE PARTS STOCK 
PAAS Ma1ntenance Concept 
In-flight fal1ures that are detected by BIT will cause the amber 
warnlng 11ght to flash. A message will be displayed on the IDCC 
on the 11ne reserved for warning messages. 
"Devlce Failure" followed by ldentlflcation 
(Vertlcal Gyro, Compass, etc.). 
The message wl11 be, 
of the failed device. 
Functl0nal Test/Fault Localizatl0n, Automatlc, is performed at 
power-up, or when commanded by the operator, and tests system 
components as feasible without operator interaction. This test 
functl0n exerclses DAAS equipment and identifies fal1ed LRUs as 
well as failed modules withln the LRU as feasible. 
Functional Test/Fault Locallzatlon, Interactive, is performed on 
command and allows testing of devlces where operator actl0ns or 
observatl0ns are necessary to complete a test. IDCC and EHSI 
test pattern tests are included in DAAS as examples of avionics 
lnteractive testing. 
Malntenance trouble shootlng allows the operator to apply signals 
and measure slgnals via IDCC. Memory words can be displayed. 
Analog and discrete slgnals can be applied at computer outputs, 
and various system analog and discrete slgnals can be measured 
and displayed. 
Fault localizatlon and replacement of a faulty aVlonlCS 11ne re-
placeable unlt can be accomplished in mean time of 15 minutes 
wlth the level of BIT envlsl0ned for PAAS. Repair of a faulty 
unlt, 1.e., fault 10callzatl0n and replacement of a faulty part, 
can be accompllshed ~n mean t~me of 1 hour. 
PAAS packaging must be deslgned to allow operator removal of 
hardware modules and contlnued operatl0n wlth only partial loss 
of functlon. 
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3.5 PAAS MODULARITY ANALYSIS 
PAAS is designed to be modular. The system is constructed of 
bUllding blocks that can be conflgured to provlde varylng levels 
of functlonal capablllty dependlng on user requirements. The 
deslgn lS intended to facllltate addltl0n of functl0ns wlthout 
maJor upheaval to the eXlstlng aircraft control panel or eXlstlng 
avionics. 
Modularity lS achleved through: 
• System archltecture 
• Controls and dlsplays modularity 
• Hardware modularlty 
• Software modularlty. 
Baslc system archltecture, 1.e., multlmlcroprocessors lnter-
connected via data bus, supports modularlty. Functions can be 
added by addlng appropriate process or modules, and the process-
lng can lnterface to the system through the data bus. 
PAAS employs programmable controls and dlsplays that can be re-
conflgured for varl0US functlonal complements. The IDCC lncludes 
baslc mechanical controls (keyboard page callup buttons, etc.) 
and a programmable dlsplay. The basic display module lS the dlS-
play page. The page can be used as a functlon control panel or 
for required data and lnformation lnput/output. The EHSI and 
EADI are displays that can be programmed for the set of functlons 
lncluded ln a partlcular PAAS lnstallation. 
PAAS hardware lS modular. Standard modules can be added to pro-
vlde computlng power, memory, or I/O requlred for added functions. 
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PAAS software is structured and modular. Each of the hardware 
modules are programmed with independent software modules that 
require minimum 1nterfaces w1th other functions. These software 
modules are developed US1ng structured des1gn techniques. The 
system modular1ty has been demonstrated by addit10n of the DABS 
funct1on. 
The integrat10n of DABS into DAAS late in the DAAS development 
program demonstrates bas1c modularity. Incorporation of DABS 
required --
• Installing a DABS transponder in the aircraft, and interfac-
ing it to the DAAS computer un1t. 
• Adding a DABS processor module, 1ncluding software, and two 
DABS 1nterface electronics modules to the DAAS computer unit. 
• Adding three DABS pages to the IDCC. 
• Adding a DABS "Message Pending" llght to the panel. 
The DAAS processor module is appropriate for DABS computations. 
DAAS keyboard and IDCC page formats are appropriate for DABS. 
Consequently, DABS readily fit into the DAAS framework. PAAS 
modularity 1S further assessed in the following paragraphs. 
3.5.1 PAAS System Modularity 
PAAS system modular1ty 1S demonstrated in F1gure 3-6. The var1-
ous levels of funct10nal capabllity are deplcted. The core PAAS 
functional ent1ty is the autopilot. 
The autop1lot processor and a basic I/O term1nal are required for 
this function. 
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Flgure 3-6. PAAS Modularlty 
A second verSl0n of PAAS could lnclude the autopllot and the 
air data functlons. In this version, the air data functlon would 
only supply references for the autopllot. Altimeter and lAS data 
sources would be lndependent. 
A thlrd verSl0n of PAAS could have autopllot, air data, AHRS, and 
the electronlc ADI that includes the altimeter, lAS and VSI d~s­
plays. 
A fourth version could also include the NAV, EHSl and IDCC 
functions. 
A fifth verSlon could have DABS added, and a sixth version could 
lnclude weather radar data superimposed on the EHSl. 
A seventh verSlon could include the necessary redundant hardware 
for fault tolerant operation. 
Each version of PAAS would be compllmented by systems necessary 
for desired functional capabillty and backup. A partlcular ver-
sion of PAAS could lnclude spare room to allow incorporation of 
some additional capabllity: either the defined next higher level, 
or a yet-to-be-defined advanced capability. 
3.5.2 PAAS Controls and Dlsplays Modular~ty 
The ideal controls and dlsplay conflguratl0ns from a modularity 
standpolnt, would lnclude only general purpose controls. No con-
trols dedlcated to a speclfic functlon would be allowed in order 
to mlnimlze lmpact on panel hardware when a function was added. 
In an ldeallzed PAAS conflguratlon, controls would ~nclude a 
general purpose keyboard, and one IDCC page callup button for 
each functlon. 
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DAAS has deviated from this 1deal 1n certain respects 
• Var10us dedicated NAV funct10n controls are 1mplemented 
above the IDCC, 1ncluded with page call-up buttons; 1.e., 
USE, CRS, SEL, LAT DIR TO, AUTO CRS SEQ. 
• Ded1cated map control buttons are 1mplemented next to the 
IDCC; 1.e., HOG/NOR, MAP/CRSR, MAP RTN, WP BRG, REVU, MAP 
SCALE. 
• Dedicated autopilot mode controller, annunciator panel. 
• Other funct10n controls 
These dedicated function controls were 1mplemented to max1mize 
the1r accessibil1ty. 
Ded1cated NAV funct10n controls could be avo1ded if these controls 
were instead 1mplemented in IDCC pages. The penalty for el1m1na-
tion of dedicated NAV function buttons is as follows: 
• One additional button push requ1red to act1vate LAT DIR TO. 
• One add1t1onal button push requ1red to change waYPo1nt data 
access from 11nked waypo1nt, to unl1nked waypo1nt. 
The advantage of th1S approach, in addit10n to improved modular1ty, 
1S el1m1nat10n of ded1cated NAV funct10n buttons above the IDCC, 
Wh1Ch leaves only page call-up buttons there. Th1S eases system 
comprehenslon. 
Current ded1cated map control buttons do not slgn1f1cantly degrade 
modularity. They can be an integral part of the EHSI assembly. 
Spare control buttons should be included, however, for additional 
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functions which use the EHSI, which will also have dedicated con-
trols, e.g., weather radar. 
The PAAS AUtoP1lot mode controller is a dedicated panel. Acces-
slb1lity to the safety crit1cal mode controller seems to preclude 
1tS 1ncorporat10n into multifunction control facil1t1es such as 
the IDCC. The autop1lot mode annunciator panel would 11kely be 
incorporated into the EADI if EADI were included 1n PAAS. 
3.5.3 PAAS Hardware Modularity 
The exist1ng DAAS hardware 1S modular. The bas1c hardware bU1ld-
1ng block is the processor board, Figure 3-7. This 6.25 by 6.25 
1nch printed c1rcuit board includes 
• INTEL 8086 16-bit microprocessor 
• 2K x 16 PROM Memory 
• 4K x 16 RAM Memory 
• Crystal clock 
• IEEE 488 bus talker/listener/controller 
• Interrupt controller 
If more than 4K x 16 memory 1S required for a part1cular PAAS 
processor, a supplemental 6.25 by 6.25 inch memory board is used. 
Th1S memory board can conta1n up to 12K x 16 additional RAM 
memory. Other hardware modules that could be employed 1n a PAAS 
system 1nclude. 
• EADI, EHSI display refresh memory module 
• Bubble memory module 
• Analog/Discrete I/O modules 
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Figure 3-7. DAAS Processor Module 
PAAS would employ a higher level of circu1t integration than the 
eX1st1ng DAAS system. Custom VLSIC would be econom1cal for PAAS 
for the bas1c hardware modules. Explo1t1ng modularlty of a pro-
duct10n version of PAAS requ1res the follow1ng hardware des1gn 
cons1derations 
• The PAAS computer box must have suff1c1ent room and external 
connector p1n capaclty to support eventual growth. 
• Power supply - The PAAS power supply must have reserve capac-
ity to support eventual system growth or else the power sup-
ply must be changed as functions are added. 
• Data bus throughput - The PAAS data bus must have sufficient 
throughput margln to support eventual system growth. The 
current system IEEE 488 bus is only 30 percent loaded, which 
1S consistent with th1S requirement. The PAAS data bus 
would requ1re hlgher throughput to accommodate the AHRS and 
weather radar functions. 
3.5.4 PAAS Software Modularlty 
PAAS software must be modular. Funct10ns are implemented in 
software modules; i.e., independent programs wlth single entry 
and eX1t, separate data locat10ns and clearly defined and con-
trolled interfaces. Data bus communicat1ons are managed 1n an 
orderly fash10n by the bus control processor, w1th growth in mind. 
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SECTION 4 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The DAAS system des1gn 1S completed, and fl1ght hardware bU1lt. 
Slmulator evaluat10ns have been performed. The PAAS conf1gura-
t10n has been def1ned and analyzed on the bas1s of cost, rel1ab1l-
ity, ma1nta1nabil1ty, and modular1ty. The follow1ng conclusions 
and recommendat10ns are based on the exper1ence assoc1ated with 
th1S effort to date. 
• Funct10nal Configuration - DAAS prov1des expanded funct10nal 
capab1lity w1th respect to currently available aV10n1CS and 
has the potential to significantly improve slngle p1lot IFR 
safety and efficiency. The DAAS arch1tecture provides the 
framework for add1t1onal expansion w1thout the requ1rement 
for added displays. Th1S 1S accompl1shed by using the shared 
data base, d1splays and bus. The d1stributed architecture 
of the system prov1des for funct10nal independence. This 
min1m1zes the number of needed interfaces between functions 
and thereby reduces data 1nput and subsequent p1lot tra1n1ng. 
• Funct10n Set - The DAAS funct10n set is comprehens1ve and 
sU1table for demonstrat1on. Operat1onal slmpl1f1cation and 
functional addit10ns have been suggested that may be appro-
priate for an operat1onal system. 
• Cost - The DAAS concept 1S cost effect1ve, and has cost ad-
vantages w1th respect to convent1onal aV1on1CS as the number 
of 1ntegrated funct10ns 1ncrease. 
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• Reliability - The DAAS system arch1tecture reduces computer 
system failure rate to a negl1gible port1on of the total 
system fa1lure rate. Sensor and servo failure rates dom1nate. 
Low cost sensor and servo redundancy should be pursued w1th 
a goal of 10,000 hours 1n-flight MTBF for autop1lot and bas1c 
navigation funct10ns to provide extremely rel1able pilot re-
llef to fac1l1tate effective fl1ght management. The PAAS 
configurat1on prom1ses much h1gher functional reliab1l1ty. 
• Maintainability - DAAS offers 1mprovements in avion1cs ma1n-
tainability through improved reliability, automatic fault 
detect10n and isolation, and on-a1rcraft trouble shoot1ng 
w1thout spec1al test equ1pment. 
• Modular1ty - DAAS 1S funct10nally modular, w1th general pur-
p.se controls and displays, and hardware and software bU1ld-
ing blocks to prov1de varying levels of capabil1ty. Expan-
sion of capability has minimum impact on the existing a1rcraft 
control panel and exist1ng avionics. 
Following is an expans10n of these conclus10ns and recommendat1ons. 
4.1 FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY 
The DAAS system provides comprehensive facilit1es for flight 
management. Concensus of evaluat10ns 1S that DAAS prov1des 1m-
proved funct10nal capab1lit1es w1th respect to current avion1cs, 
and has the potent1al to slgn1f1cantly 1mprove single p1lot IFR 
eff1c1ency and safety. Checkl1sts, weight and balance, and per-
formance funct10ns are conven1ent to use, and they support good 
p1lot pract1ces. The moving map display, IDeC data readout, and 
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comprehensive warning system 1nform the p1lot of fl1ght status. 
The autop1lot, Wh1Ch couples to the NAV system, provides the 
necessary rel1ef that allows the p1lot to monitor and effectively 
manage his fllght. 
The DAAS mov1ng map display 1S well recelved and consldered a 
major ald in fllght management. However, the followlng enhance-
ments have been suggested. 
• Term1nal area display should be expanded to include stored 
approach plate details. Automated terminal area flight 
management including coupled NAV and autothrottle functions 
should be consldered. 
• It would be deslrable to accurately dlsplay the runway during 
landing approach. This could, perhaps, be feasible if 1) a 
strapdown AHRS with short term INS capab111ty were a part of 
DAAS, or 2) MLS were lncluded, or 3) GPS were included, or 
4) ILS/DME navigation mode were included. 
• A color map display would be useful to faCllltate increased 
display information content. 
• Expanslon of DABS to ald 1n congested termlnal area communi-
cations would be desirable. 
• Incorporatl0n of an EADI into DAAS would be an approprlate 
follow-on effort to further develop the concept. 
The DAAS function set is considered representatlve and adequate 
for demonstration purposes. There are areas where changes might 
be consldered for an operat1onal system. For example, DAAS com-
plexlty must be controlled and pilot/system lnterface must be 
efficient to maxlmize p1lot access to DAAS functl0ns. 
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DAAS controls and d1splays have been generally accepted by 
evaluators, including the alphanumer1c keyboard. The system 
slmulator IDee touchpo1nt mechanization was found obJectionable 
because: 
• No tactlle feedback to 1ndicate slgnal 1n1tiat10n. 
• Smudges on CRT face obscured 1mage. 
• Inadvertent data entr1es possible if touchpoints are not 
accurately touched. 
An alternate approach using bezel-mounted buttons has been added. 
The DAAS Kalman f1lter blend1ng of VOR/DME data w1th dead recon1ng 
pos1tion 1S expected to improve navigat10n, precision and stabil-
ity. The addit10n of DME/DME 1ntegrat10n into the DAAS algorithms 
seems like an appropr1ate follow-on. Integration of an IRS to 
augment the blender pos1t10n should also be considered. 
4.2 COST 
DAAS includes slgnif1cantly more funct10nal capability at a cost 
compet1t1ve w1th convent10nal avion1cs, as illustrated 1n section 
3.3. The DAAS cost advantage will become more dec1s1ve as more 
funct10ns are 1ncorporated. For example, DAAS could be expanded 
to integrate. 
• Weather radar 
• A1r data computer 
• Autothrottle 
• Automat1c storage of a1rport fac1lity data 
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• AHRS 
• Radar alt1meter 
• Other funct10ns 
Therefore, with each function added total system cost per func-
t10n would come down Slnce packaging power suppl1es, and controls 
and displays are shared in DAAS and need not be dupl1cated for 
separate functions. 
Consequently, the DAAS concept of 1ntegrated aV10nics is cost 
effective. 
4.3 RELIABILITY, SAFETY 
The PAAS system reliab1l1ty, including sensors, instruments, 
computers, and servos is estimated to be 137 hours MTBF. Th1S 
system reliab1l1ty 1S expected to improve as 1ntegrated circu1t 
technology advances, and electromechanical devices are replaced 
by SOlld state dev1ces. 
The existing DAAS NAVjAutOP1lot function rel1ab1l1ty 1S est1mated 
to be 9260 hours mean fl1ght time between loss of funct10n. 
The DAAS architecture, US1ng advanced electron1cs, has produced 
a very rel1able computer system. Consequently, DAAS rel1ab1l1ty 
was affected mainly by sensor and servo fa1lure rates, e.g., 
system sensors and servos contr1bute 96 percent of the autop1lot 
failure rate. Slnce the autopilot and NAV funct10ns are essen-
tial to effect1ve fl1ght management, 1t is recommended that low 
cost redundant sensor and servo conf1gurat10ns be pursued, w1th 
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a goal of 10,000 hour NAV/autopilot flight MTBF. The DAAS 
architecture can cost effectively provide such reliab111ty. 
The fa1lure mode effects analysis of 86 DAAS elements concludes 
that, w1th recommended mod1f1cat1ons 1mplemented, DAAS failures 
are tolerable and safe. The DAAS safety pilot's contribut10n to 
flight safety is also acknowledged, espec1ally 1n take-off and 
land1ng s1tuations. 
4.4 MAINTAINABILITY 
DAAS concept offers improved ma1nta1nab1lity through: 
• Improvements 1n hardware reliab111ty 
• Built-in test for automatic fault detect1on, local1zation 
• Capabil1ty for on-aircraft trouble shoot1ng w1thout special 
test equ1pment. 
4.5 MODULARITY 
The DAAS system is functionally modular. It 1S composed of hard-
ware and software building blocks that can be configured to pro-
vide varY1ng levels of functional capab1lity and cost. Expansion 
of capability w111 have m1n1mum 1mpact on the exist1ng DAAS air-
craft control panel and aV1onics. 
The DAAS system can be adapted to interface with devices from a 
var1ety of manufacturers. For example, hardware and software 
modules could be developed to allow use of different NAV receivers, 
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even 1f the NAV rece1vers were not equ1pped for remote tun1ng. 
Manual tun1ng would be required 1n this verS10n of DAAS, on com-
mand from the IDee. The system can also accept 1nput s1gnals 
from sensors supplied by a var1ety of manufacturers. The var1ety 
of subsystems with wh1ch a product10n verS10n of DAAS would be 
compatible would be determ1ned in a market1ng study. 
DABS 1ntegrat10n into DAAS late 1n the DAAS development program 
demonstrates basic modularity. Incorporation of DABS requ1red: 
• Installing a DABS transponder and control panel 1n the a1r-
craft, and interfacing it to the DAAS computer unit. 
• Add1ng a DABS processor module, and two DABS 1nterface elec-
tron1CS modules to the DAAS computer. 
• Adding three DABS pages to the IDee. 
• Adding a DABS "Message Pend1ng" l1ght to the panel. 
The DAAS processor module is appropr1ate for DABS computat10ns. 
DAAS keyboard and IDee page formats are appropr1ate for DABS. 
DABS read1ly f1t 1nto the DAAS framework, thereby demonstrat1ng 
that DAAS 1S a h1ghly modular system. 
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GLOSSARY 
ADI - altitude direction indlcator 
AHRS - Altltude Heading Reference System 
ALT - altitude, altitude hold 
ARM - arm 
ATC Air Traffic Control (National) 
BIT - built-in test 
CC - central computer 
CCU - central computer unit 
COM - communication 
COMM - communication message 
CPU - central computer unit 
DAAS - Demonstration Advanced Avionics System 
DABS - Discrete Address Beacon System 
DME - distance measuring equipment 
EHSI - electronic horizontal situation indicator 
ELM - extended length message 
EPROM - electrically alterable PROM 
ETA - estimated tlme of arrival 
FAR - federal aviation regulation 
FDI - flight director indicator 
GMT - Greenwich mean tlme 
GS - glides lope 
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GLOSSARY 
HOG - heading 
lAS - lndicated air speed 
IDCC - integrated data control center 
IFR - instrument flight regulations 
LOC - localizer 
MDA - minimum descent altitude 
MLS - microwave landing system 
NAV - navigation 
NAVAID - navigational aid 
PAAS - Projected Advanced Avionics System 
PROM - programmable read-only memory 
RAM - random access memory 
RAU - radio adapter unit 
RMI - radio magnetic indicator 
ROM - read-only memory 
RPM - revolutions per minute 
SEL select 
SM - standard message 
UV - ultra-violet 
UV-EPROM - ultra-violet eraseable PROM 
VFR - visual flight regulatl0ns 
VHF very high frequency 
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GLOSSARY 
VNAV - vertical navigation 
VOR - VHF omnldirectional (omni) range 
VOR/LOC - VOR localizer 
VOR/LOC/GS - VOR localizer glideslope 
VSI - vertical speed indicator 
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APPENDIX A 
PROFILES OF DAAS TEST PARTICIPANTS 
SUBJECT PROFILE #1 
Name: Bll1 Unternaehrer 
Position Deslgn Engineering, Honeywell, Inc. 
Number of Years Active Flying: 13 years 
Certified Fllght Instructor: Yes 
Ratlngs: ATP, MEL, Commerclal, SEL, SES, GIlder 
Fllght Instructor - Instrument and Airplane 
Experlence wlth HSI; Yes (20 hours) 
Aircraft Flown 
Plper (Slngle & Twin) 
Cessna (Slngle) 
Currently Fly Cessna 
Flight Hours 
133 
550 
1500 
SUBJECT PROFILE #2 
Name Larry Pedersen 
Pos1tion .. Superv1sor, Test Equ1pment F1eld Engineer1ng, 
Honeywell, Inc. 
Number of 
Cert1f1ed 
Ratings. 
Years Act1ve FlY1ng 15 years 
Fl1ght Instructor: Yes 
ATP, A1rplane and Power Plan Mechan1c 
Fl1ght Instructor - A1rplane and Instrument 
Experience with HSI. Yes (K1ng HSI) 
Aircraft Flown Fl1ght Hours 
Cessna (Single & Tw1n) 825 
Beech (Single & Tw1n) 205 
P1per (Single 800 
Others 20 20 
Currently Fly Beech Bonanza, Cessna 172, Cessna 421 
SUBJECT PROFILE #3 
Name Ron Albertson 
Position: P1lot, K1ng Rad10 Corp. 
Number of 
Certified 
Rat1ngs: 
Years Active Flying' 12 years 
Flight Instructor. Yes 
MEL, ATP, Gold Seal 
Fl1ght Instructor - A1rplane and Instrument 
Experience w1th HSI: Yes (KFC 300, KFC 200, KFC 250, 
Bendix 810, Mitchel) 
A1rcraft 
Beech 
P1per 
Cessna 
Bellanca 
Mooney 
Currently 
Flown 
Fly: All above 
Fl1ght Hours 
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3,000 
3,000 
3,000 
3,000 
3,000 
SUBJECT PROFILE #4 
Name: John Llndberg 
Posltlon' Pilot, Instrument FIlght Trainlng 
Number of 
Certlfled 
Ratlngs 
Years Actlve FlYlng: 10 
Fllght Instructor: Yes 
MEL, ATP 
Fllght Instructor - Alrplane and Instrument 
Experience wlth HSI: Yes (KFC 300, KFC 200, Collins Bendix, Narco) 
Alrcraft Flown 
Beech 
Plper 
Cessna 
Bellanca 
Mooney 
Currently Fly: All above 
SUBJECT PROFILE #5 
Name. Dan Rodgers 
Flight Hours 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
Position: Director Speclal ProJects, Klng Radio 
Number of Years Actlve FlYlng: 
Certified Fllght Instructor. 
Ratlngs. MEL, Prlvate Instrument 
Experience wlth HSI. Yes, ProJect Engineer KFC 300 and KFC 200 
Alrcraft Flown Flight Hours 
Beech 
Plper 
Cessna 
Mooney 
Currently Fly All above 
Not available 
Not avallable 
Not available 
Not avallable 
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APPENDIX B 
DAAS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
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FAILIJRt 
110 
2 
OMS lLEflEUT 110 FAILURt 
Encodlny Altl- -571 Fault 
lIIeter within the 
Altlm 
Co-Pilot 
Altimeter 
Conclusion 
Fault 
in the 
Altimeter 
FAILURE AFFlCTlO 
RATE*lU6 HtHEtnS 
201l Altimeter 
Indicator 
Dabs Transpond 
KT76A • 
AlP CPU 
AlP I. IOCC CPlo 
AlP lio NAV CPU 
EFFECTS OF FAILURE 
Erroneous Visual Output 
Erroneous Output 
Erroneous 
"G Proximl ty warn" 
lrroneous "Alt Advisory" 
Light Info (Alt Alert. 
HlJA & OIl ) 
Erroneous Parameter 
TO & Nav. Calculation 
llAAS FAILURl 
WARN ETC CAT£C,ORY 
Yes. Power 3 
Servo Loop 
Error Check J 
Amber Light 
J 
2 
3 
Far 91 do not require redundant altimeters for cat 1 IFR. only for CAt II 
The Probabfli ty for a fallure Is -10-3 during 4 hours fit. slgnlficantl 
The co-pllot Instrumentation required In OMS OK 
200 Altimeter 
Indicator 
Erroneous Visual lAitput 110 2 
CUlulL"T, 
OUrlng IFk-cOIlUItI"hS 
Proxloil ty l.arn LJO /lot 
Uetect Vertical (JLstacle~ 
MIsleads Traffic COlltrol 
Wrong warn Tloresllol<J 
",econdary lffect" 
Iorollg Fuel or T 0 -
Ulstance CalculatIon 
Wi 11 cause Sllll'" IOconven-
ience untll decided wll1cn 
altim. faned. 
Conclusion Loss of the co-pllot altitude Info Is a minor problelll to the OMS pllot The probabllfty of loss of --6 2 botn .paro-altlmers during 4 fit hrs. is A- ( Apltot + A altll11)pllot • (A pltot + A altlm)co-pilot - (4.250 10 ) 
- 10- A catastrophe will occur If the AlC collides with an object not detected Soy the ~roxlmity 
warning systeln The probabllity for thts to happen 15 considerably less than 10· 
b 
III) FAlllJRt 
FJ,ILlJ/lL AHLCTlu 
MIL * lv· tLLI'/£IITS <FFlCTS u~ FAILUht 
~AILuKl 
LATtuvHY 
/lauar t\ll1"'"t~r KTUI Fault In AlP CPL ~ luCC lrroneous!lll Proxlllll tJ 
\-Jarn II 
Roll Alt 
Val III 
TII~ ",rOLdLJ111tJ «J.O- b 
for uaro -dnlJ 
True Al r 
Speed ~ensor 
IA~ Instru-
,nent 
Co-PI lot 
Tii5IiiSt ru-
.. tent 
Air Uata 
Computer 
Kall "It ovU 
Incl Alit ... /P CPu " L"~I lrroll~uus RaJ "It I lifo (Aa',~er II yo t) ,,"J"r-~l t1l,' ~"11ures 
Uo Far ~l r.~ulreme"t on Rad Alt if Installed, fail warn required Vall<Jltj sIgnal U~ 
A critical situation (4) occur If Loth tne Ll.Iro Alt and Rad Alt falls 
Hegllglble probability OK 
VA210 Faul tin luO 
Tas OR 
A/P & ,lav CPU 
EllS I 
lrroneous Inputs to /jav 
& Fuel Con sum 
calculations 
2 PI 1 lIt cOlifuseJ 1"I~"t 
create " ~roDle<., If no 
radio ,jav availa"l. 
Panel 
I..UC-
380 
SIgn Cond 
Conclusion TAS not required by Far YI 
Instru-
lloent 
Failure 
Conclusion 
Instru-
ment 
Fa ilure 
Conclusion 
Ins tru-
ment 
Failure 
Conclusion 
It Is very unlikely «lU-6) t.\Ot a lAS fanure will cause a critical Situation In UAA~ 
due to redundant lAS and VOR/Ul4E Infonoatlon 
lAS 
IndIcator 
lrroneous visual output Ijo 
Single lAS InstrlJllent OK for Cat I IFR, For ~l. 2 required Cat 11 conditions 
loss of lAS Instrunlent not critical In OAA~ Redundant visual speed Info avallable 
2tlU lAS 
Indicator 
lrroneous visual output 
loss of Co-Pilot lAS Info no problem to the pilot 
No Neylectable to pilot 
Redundant Info available 
(lAS + RPM) 
The probaullity of loss of bot., lAS Indicators are (wltn reference to fault 1;0 2) 
(4 3JU-Iu-6)2 -2.10-6 Tne risk for a caUstropne is significantly lower In toe uMS 
syste<ns since redundant Info such as VOR/IJHE and angle of attack are avaIlable OK 
200 AlP CPU lrroneous ~-H ~19nal 
Far part 91 do not requl re a 3rJ lAS/All ~ensor 
Yes 
Alt Valid 
(Amber Light) 
Tloe Alt /IAS valid and available redundant Info WIll ,.,Immlze risks 
2 Additional Alt & V~ 
Info available Tne 
~11ot monItors Alt nolll 
FAILUKl 
14U LlAAS EL lHllj T 
8 
9 
10 
PUot system 
Co-pilot 
pi tot system 
Outside air 
temp 
,4lJ FAILURl 
left faul ty 
PTOT or 
PSTAT 
right faulty 
PTOT or 
PSTAT 
FAILUKt. AHt.CTlU 
KJlTL*lO" ELU-IEUT~ 
50 
50 
AltImeter 
VSI-inditator 
IAS-inditator 
ADC KUC-300 
Altimeter 
VSI-inditator 
IAS-inditator 
HFlLT~ UF FAILURL 
Erroneous 
ALT & 4-H info 
lAS & VSI 
flight Wclrning 
proximity • 
transponder response 
Erroneous visual info to 
to-pilot 
lJAA~ 
WARN lIC 
NO 
140 
FAILUkl 
LATlGURY 
3 
CUNHt.ljT~ 
ConfusIng info 
Risk for wrong 
attion in UR 
tond Pilot or 
ground tontrol 
Co-pilot not in the 
tontrol loop 
Contlusion Dual PITOT systems required by FAR 91 only for CAT II operations For OAAS, the to-pIlot and the right 
sensor or 5 
sign tond 
failure 
P ITOT sys tem prov i de adequa te redundanty 7 
The probability of failures in both left and right PITOT systems is - (4 50· 10-' )«lU-
Very low risk: 
NAV-CPU Erroneous input to TO, 
truise, and fuel/dlstante 
taltulat 
NO 2 Fuel qty tnetks 
WIll alarm pilot in 
tIme for r~fuellng 
Probability of failure 
low 
Cond US i Oil IlO OAT requ i red by FAR 
vAT failure is not assllned to tause severe ~ilot problems It is suggested, however, 
that inputs to taltulations suth as OAT ALT ett are displayed to the pilot when useu 
FAILUR!;. FAILURL AFFlCTEU DMS 
ItU UAA~ lLLlIlljT FAILURl RAn*IU~ ELUlllHS lFFlCTS OF FAILUkE WARN HC 
FAILURl 
LATEGORY 
11 
12 
IJ 
14 
IoIag/lat lC ~ I ux 
uetector 
Slave Acces-
IHreLtloila I ~YKU 
llld"<liu~ 
~cott T/Ulltl 
tJ-iT Faulty 
11, Hag. flor th 
ref signal 
2U Radio Magnetic 
Indicator 
and lltSl 
AlP - CPU 
UAV - CPU 
IDec-cpu 
Erroneous Visual OUtput 
(1I1r GYRO slaved to 
Hag Fx Det) 
Faulty Hdg lrror 
In tldg-hold mode 
Flul ty Navigation 
and fuel/distance 
calculations 
,lo 3 
3 
3 
The ~Illlt 1111~1"" "I ~-o 
Indicators glYlng coushtont 
faultl Inforillotion 
KlH11, essential uultl 
l.alillan FIlter will uut~"t 
exceSSlYe Wlnu, s~olllny 
ca I cu 1a t Ions 
ConclUSion Far 91 requires mag dlr Indicator and dlr GYRO for IFR l dlr bYROS req for Cat 11 conJ 
Co-pilot dlr GYRO and Hag compass makes DAAS okl 
KA Dead or 
51A wrong 
out~ut 
lU The Indicator Faulty visual output Uo 
Conclusion Far ~1 do not ex~lIcltly state the need of a slave accessory 
~aultl 
KSG .klg Out-
1~~ ~ut 
JOO RaJlo lllaynetic 
lnJlcator aud 
lIlS1 
hiP - CPu 
UAV - CPU 
IDec-cpu 
Conclusion See fault No 11 cOlIIJIents 
lrroneous visual output 
Faul ty tldg lrror In 
IIdg 'lode 
Faulty navigatIon 
and fuel/distance 
calculations 
Yes 
Iklg valid 
(Aillber Light) 
3 
RlH and h.ay cO"I~ass Info 
avaIlable to ~llot, ell",I-
na tes Lonfus Ion 
illr bYRO essentIal 
s-=-= '4U 11 COI.lliltmt::. 
~ee 
The 01r GYkO validity-test coverage - 7u. Probability for undetected failure (u J 4 • 3uO'1O-b ) 
- 4'lil-' during a 4 hours flight Still significant I 
RadIO n.aguetlc KZ Fault In 33~ RHI Indicator Erroneous visual output f1a9 COlI",ass, PI,I and tri~1 
~rovldes r~dun.Jant Info to 
~Ilot 
IndIcator 226 the RIll 
GYRO or VOR mode 
ConclUSIon Far requirelllent see No 11 OK 
FAILUR~ FAILURE AfFECTED UMS FAILlJkl 
NU OMS lLH1EIH ,40 FAILURE RATl*IO~ ELEMENTS EFFECTS OF FAILURE WAilN ETC CATEGORY ~OH/'llNTS 
Co-Pilot {~ Faulty 20 PNI Erroneous Visual Output lio 15 .... g Flux Mag North (Slave Acc 
Detector Ref Signal 
16 Slave Aceessory KA Dead or 
SIA Wrong 
10 Slave Acc Erroneous Vhual Output No I to the pilot 
OutPut 
17 Directional KG faulty JOO PIli lrroneous Visual Output No (2 to co-pilot) 
GYRO lOlA IIdg (Slave Acc 
Output 
Id Plctura 1 IliIv 1(1 Hag Card JJO PIli Erroneous Visual Output No 
Indica tor !l25A Error (P ,. I ) 
Conclusion Loss of co-pilot slaved directional GYRU Info Is a II1lnor problem to the OMS pilot 
The probability of one failure In the pilot slaved directional GYRO system and one 
failure In the co-pilot system Is (4 660 lU-~)2 <IU -5 The probability Is remote and tne 
f-£ mag compass and VOR info available II1Ikes the risk very low 
tj::I. 
19 Turn and Slip liRe Faulty I~O Turn Rate Erroneous Visual Output lio Turn rate deterlllined from f-£ Instrument Allen" Turn Rate Indicator roll angle as replacement 
Instrument 
Faulty 10 Slip No Side acceleration sensed by 
Slip 
Instrument 
indicator pilot acceptable replacement 
Conclusion Single slip-Skid Indicator requi red for cat I and II IFR, By Far 91. 
Loss of this instrument minor problem 
lO Co-Pilot Faulty 150 Turn Rate Erroneous V Isua 1 Output No 
TUr'iiliiifSl1p Turn Rate Indicator 
Instrument Instrument 
faulty lU Slip Indicator lrroneous Visua 1 Olrtput No 
Slip 
Instrument 
Conclusion Ilegl1gible to the pilot and co-pilot 
FAILURl 
1.0 OAAS lLll111H NO 
21 Yaw Rate GYRO GG 
l4U 
<. Myle of kttad Type 
::u=lI~ur am.I lC 
IllfJ h.d tor 
.3 vcrLledl LYI'U VL 
2JJ 
fAILURE 
faul tY 
GYRO 
FAILURl AfFECTlO 
RATl*I06 lLlMEllTS 
NP - CPU 
EffECTS Of fAILURE 
Wors t Case Rudder trans-
Ient and convergent Yaw 
oscillations 
DAAS 
WARII HC 
No 
fAILUlll 
CATEGORY CIJIot1l1H~ 
Incullvenlent bef~re VI" 
and AI P disengaged 
ConclusIOn It Is assUilled thAt the rudder servo slip clutch protects against danyerous Slue- and 
angulu-Accleratlolls and that tIM! NP dlJllp switch Is an Adequate mean to dlsengaye tne 
Y/I) 
FAulty 
Out~ut 
ConclUSIOn 
Fault.) 
Pitell 
dod/or 
Roll 
SI~lIal 
luU NP - CPU ~tilll warning gIVen at 
non,1iI10\, ur not given 
.-411ell n;~Jt:d 
1.0 Far requlrelnent on an~le of attack Illdlcotor or stall warnln~ 
JJIJ Attltud~ Ulrect Lrroneous "ArtIfIcial 
Indleat ... r .. orlzon" 
AlP - CPu 
~ervos 
~11~1 - CPU 
lrrors In control lalls, 
lrror In predIcted 
Trendllnes 
Ves 
"Vert ~VRO 
Va lid" 
(Amber L Ignt) 
Far .1 re~ulres I "Artlflcal olorlzon" for Cat I conditIons alld 2 for Cat II 
Tile coverage of tile validity test Is - (oj 3 4 33u-h)-6) - 4-lU-' SI~Il1flcolltl 
For l3 132~ e) a nardover faIlure In tile vertical GYRO roll output propages Vii 
Vhual en.d, of tile 
InJleolor anJ cruSS"'I~e. vf 
s~c:~d, v~rt st'ceu aflJ 
at tHude will reveAl A 
fault 
Ulfflcult FaIlure tv"eteet, 
especIally for zoro uutput, 
~lllce -wI, hIP 0"..1 tll~l all 
Agree Cluse ovst:rvonce of 
otner ~L-Instru"ellts 
aS~UI1it:u 
tne A/P cant laws to roll, yaw and pitch axis ThIS IS not acceptable to For ,j) worJ1IJY 
A modIfication to ellllJinate the Far-conflict Is recoRlJl@n<.led 
fllllUIlt: 
IOU UAA~ Ll~lllln 
24 
27 
29 
30 
Attitude Ulr ~CI 
Inuicator 310 
"Artlfi lior!" 
Co-Pilot 
"ArtiTr 
Ilorlzon" 
Manifold 
Pressure 
Instrulllerrt 
lngines KPI1 
Instrument 
lxh (,as 
Teilip Instr 
Engine Status 
Instruillent 2 
lngine Status 
Instrument 2 
KG 
258 
Panel 
Panel 
Panel 
Panel 
Panel 
FAILUKl 
Faul~ 
"Artif 
Horizon· 
FAILUKl AHECTED 
KATE*lu' tLEHWTS lFFlCTS uF FAILURE 
340 "Artifi Horiz" Faul~ Visual Output 
Indicator 
DMS 
WARN ETC 
No 
~AILURl 
CATll>UliY 
2 
Conclusion Far requirements, see fault No 23 
The LlAAS is OK in this respect 
Fault in 
"Artifi 
Hod zon ll 
Unit 
Conclusion 
Instruo .. nt 
Fallure 
Instrument 
Fallure 
Instrument 
Fallure 
Low 011 
Pressure 
or High 
Temp 
Low 011 
Pressure 
or High 
Temp 
670 "Artifi Horiz" faul ~ Visual Output 
Indicator 
No 
Loss of the co-pllot Artificial Horizon is a lI1inor problem The suction 
indicator SIIOWS if "power" is avallable and provides valuable info to 
the pilot 
The probabllity A of failures !D both vertica4GYROS and "Artificial Horizons" 
flight is • 4 • (330 + 340) • 10 x 4 ·670· 10 or 7 .10 4 • The risk for loss 
of both "Artificial Horizons" 15 not negligible and may bring tne pilot in a 
delilanding situation 
11.1 
10 
10 
10 
10 
Map Indicator 
IIPH Indicator 
lbT Indicator 
Eng Status 
Indicator 1 
lngine Status 
Indicator 2 
FaultY Visual Uutput 
Faul~ Visual Output 
Faul~ Visual Out~ut 
Faul~ Visual Out~ut 
faul~ Visual Output 
110 
110 
liD 
110 
No 
~1 
: r 
AlP olOdes ana reaunddnt Info 
available 
The UM5 pi 1 ot can eas 111 
determi ne that the ~l>"d 1 S 
faulty Several reaunaant 
iooicators availaol~ to 11110 
durin~ a 4 hr. 
In CUe of an instru" .. nt 
fallure tnese instruments 
and audiovisual feed backs 
provide enough info to 
the pllot to allow correct 
fallure loca l1zation 
Faulty indication of low 
011 pressure Indy uurwg 
SOIl" conditions force 
the pllot to shut off tne 
engine and land A SAP 
Conclusion Far 91 requires with exception of the EGT, the engine instrUllll!ntation Listed above (VFR conditions) 
OMS independent of these instrUllllnts 
FAilURE FAilURE AFFlCTED UMS FAllURl 
110 UAAS EllNWT NO FAilURE RATE*106 ELEr4E1ITS lFFECTS OF FAllURl WARN HC CATEGORY ClJMoIlliT ~ 
31 Fuel Flow Faulty Fuel Flow Faulty Visual Output Ilo Fuel IIty Info avalla~le 
Sensor I Sensor Indicator 
IDce Faulty IDCC Info No "Estlm Fuel Remaining" 
"Fuel Rllllalning 11me" may Indicate too much 
"lstlm Fuel Remaining" left. which will mislead 
the p1\ot 
Conclusion Far 91 do not require a fuel flow sensor 
A faul ty sensor might result In a pilot decision to continue a f\1ght without sufficient fuel 
I-" Fuel qty cross checks may not reveal the situation It Is a low pro~bllity «10-
6 ) that tile 
~ pllot might end up In a flight safety Critical situation (4) 
~ 32 Fuel Flow Faul ty 
Sensor 2 Sellsor lullmCAl TO FAULT IlO 31 
33 Fuel lIty Panel Faulty 1,U Fuel IIty Faulty Visual Output 140 L UMS provides Independent 
Sensor Indicator and redundant Info re-
l or R gardlng remalnlny fuel 
tonclusloll For ~1 requires fuel qty InstrUlilent for VFR conditions UAAS supports tile pllot In hIS 
fuel/distance/tlme calculations. "nlch uljJroves the 
InstrullIent fa1\ures 
probablllty of detecting fuel qty 
34 hanifold Cele- Faulty AlP - CPU \larnlng + No llap Faul t Ilo Redundant engine Instru-
Pressure sco Sensor Amber light ments provides adequate 
Sensors Ilo Warn + Hap Faul t Info 
35 Engine RPII IlASA Faulty III AlP - CPu Warning + Ilo RPrI Fault Ilo Redundant engine Instru-
Sensors and Sensor IDCC 1\i,lber Light nllnts provides adequate 
F IV Converter Light lio Warning + RPl4 Fault Info 
Conclusion OK 
FAILUHE FAILURE AFFECTED OAAS FAILURk. 
NO DAAS ELEllk.IIT flO FAILURE RATl*106 lLHllliTS EfHCTS OF FAILURE WARN HC CATlGORY Cl\·ll-iloH5 
36 Wing Flap Pos faulty 2u AlP - CPU Warning + OK flap pos No Heyular Ins~~etlon -~ensors Potentlo- IDCC AIober L1 gh t routlnes 01111 stili be 
meter 110 Warning + OK flaps followell "y tne pl1~t 
37 k.1 eva tor Trim faul ty 2u AlP - CPU Warnl ng + OK flap pos Ilo Reyular lnsl'eetlon -Pos 5ensor Potentlo- luCC Ainber L1gnt routines 01111 H111 oe 
meter liO Warning + UK flap pos fOllowell by tile pllut 
311 Cowl flaps faul ty 4 AlP - CPU Warning + OK flap pos Ilo ~yular Ins~eetloil -Pos ~ensors SOIl ten IUCC Amber L1ght routines will stl11 De 
flo Warnlng + UK flap 1'05 followeJ "y tile 1'11ut 
...... 3~ Lanll I ny loear faul ty 4 AlP- CPU Warnlilg + OK position flo ~eyular Ins~eetlon -~ Pos ~~nsors ~wlteil IDCC Amber L1ght routines will still be CJ1 flo Warning + OK position fOllowed by tile ~Ilot 
4u Cabln iloors faulty 4 AlP - CPU Warnlny + 01. posltloll 110 Hegular Inspeetloll -Pos ~ensors Switch IUCC Amb~r L Iyht routines .111 stili be 
140 Warning + O~ posHlon followed by tne ~Ilot 
41 /lUX ~u~ 1 ~UI'lpS ~aul tJ 4 AlP - CPU Warning + U" posltlon 110 Heyular Ins~eetl~n -~W1tCIl pUs I t I on ~wltch lutC Amber L1yht routines 01111 still "e 
ho Warning + OK position followeJ "I the ,,1l0t 
Conclusl0n far L3 requires pltell trim Indicator (Ineluaed In Laslc InstrUll",ntatlon) "AAS 
vrovldes additional Info to alert the pilot If the AlC status Is iii It Is 
assumed that the today used vre flight cneck routlnes will be followed (If not, 
the \)AA~ lnay Introduced new fanure modes) 
fAILUKl FAILURE AFHCTlD IlAAS FAILURE 
flO OAAS lLl~IlIlT NO fAILURE RATE*10& lLEl4EHTS lFFECTS OF FAILURE WAR,I ETC CATlGORY ClJNHLt,TS 
4L ~.~ - ~wlt"n Lontrol fal1ed IVP - CPU CWS-Mode lngaged No 3 AlP and nold 1II0Jes Jis-
.lIoJ rel.teJ Wheel Switcn Clutches accidently. engaged without pl10t 
10Ylc awareness /jg info 
ConclusIon ~ar ,3 requests adequate means to disengage tne AlP OK I t Is assumed that the 
~l1ot by monitoring the instruments w111 detect a not desired CWS-mode engagement and 
that he will hold the cont wIle.,1 steady when releasing the AlP 
43 ",,-Aroun" Lontrol Failed 4 AlP - CPU Go-around mode engaged 110 l Infonllatioll ~iven on tile 
Switch Wheel Switch 'accidently allnunciator panel 
Go-around mode not 3 lJemand i I1g IllOmell ts to tilt! 
engaged when wanted pl1ot. es~ecia ly 
A/P-Ap~r/b~ 1II0de 
If in tn& 
Conclusion If the go-around mode not Is aval1able when needed a less ex~erlenced pilot may 
I-'" 
even create a critical situation (4.4.10-6 x ? ,low probabl1lty howevert) 
~ 44 lng lulsen- Lontrol ~all.,d 4 AlP - CPU Uisengage of AlP-modes 110 2 Annullcedl 
en ga~e-:.wltch wlleel Switch Trim Motor accidently 
Pitch Trim Only Aut. Trll,1 available l Use Auto -TrllO 
45 ut!t:..,- Trllll Control fa 11 Old 4 AlP - CPU 110 Hanua 1 Trim l use Auto -Trill' 
Yi tCil oheel ~wltcn Trllo' Motor Run-away Trim 3 Use Autu -Trllil 
conclUSIon Til .. Au to -Trllol func ti on re~ laces Manual Trill' ill IVP 1,lOd .. s 
"u h"tul'llut COlltrol fail .. d 4+4 AlP - LPU Ui sllngage of AlP ,10 2 Anlluncedl UUlII_ Switcn .Jllccl SwitCH Clutches modes accidently 
d.llu h~ld.J 
,lot possible tu J Isengage J uelllandlllY H, an AlP f.ll"r. 
AlP situatiun ovor ~ower 
~ossiul. 
Conclusion. Tne ~robauil1ty for this situatIon involves botn a switch failure anoJ failure II, 
anotiler flight safety critIcal element lstimated prouabl1ity k - (4 d·1Q-6 x 4·10uu 1u-6)-1 1u-7 UK 
FAILURE 
NO OAAS ELEMEriT 
47 
48 
49 
~omilunlcatlon 
T ransc.i vers 
Ant.nnas 
Navigation 
Receivers 
AnteMu 
M receIVer 
antenna 
Trans~on<ler 
Antenna 
NO 
Io.Y-
19u 
KH-
53 
KN-
62A 
KT-
76A 
FAILURE 
Faulty 
Nadio 
Conclusion 
FaulV 
VOR 
Conclusion 
faulty 
Receiver 
Conclusion 
faulty 
Transpond. 
Conclusion 
FAILURt AFFECTED 
RAH*106 ELEMENTS 
JJO COIlIIlUnication 
Aids 
DAAS 
EFFECTS OF FAILURt WARN ETC 
'lo cOl.lllUnication Ilo 
Far ~1 requires 1 two-way radio comunications system, Cat I and II 
OAAS hcls 3 systems, Including antennas. Tne ~robability of loss of 
FAILURE 
CATEGORY C(»4MtNTS 
Auumed Far ~1 ruIn 
followed 
cOlllliunication due to faulV transceivers is for DAAS (4.330.10-6 )2 x 4·660·lU-6 -~·10-B 
(Co-pilot transceiver 660.10-6 fault/FLT hour) OJ(. 
250 Radio Adpt. Sox Faulty 'lavigation Info 
NAY-CPU 
tltSI - RHI Ilo or faulV VOR/GS 
Radio Adpt Box directions. 
2 Traffic control sup~ort 
radar vectoring etc uAA~ 
deall-reckon I ng 
No 
HAV-CPU 
EIISI - ADI 
Far 91 requires appropriate Single channel navigation equipment for Cat I conditions 
and dual LOC/GS - receiving systems and & FC-guidance system for Cat It conditions 
DAAS provides triplex receivers and duplex-antennas, including co-pilot back up OK 
5UO Radio Adapt Sox Faulty 'lavlgation Info 
NAV-CPU 
lllSI 
No 2 
far 91 requires DME If flying at and above 24000 feet Separate antenna OK 
400 Radio Adapt t!OX no Identification possible No 
Far 91 do not requi re transponder. 
Fault detected "liallDiln-
Wind" etc VOR available 
Traffic control takes 
proper action 
The probability for a fanure giving infonuation poss1ble to l1isinterpret by traff1c control 
is neglected. Selhlrate antenna 
...... 
~ 
00 
fAILUI(~ UAA~ 
/lU UAAS EUllt,iT IIU fAILUk~ 
fAILUk. AFFECTED 
RA TE*106 ELEMENTS 
EFFECTS OF 
FAILURE WARN ~TC 
fAILUk~ 
CATlGOkY 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
Audio headset. KIfA-24 Fault in 200 
receiving 
part. 
Fault in 
traumit 
part. 
Earleta, 
apeakerl 
microphonea 
No audio info 
Talk, Nav. OK 11K 
Bo outgoina talk 
NO 
One-way COlllD p081ible 
C~CLUSION FAE 91 require. only one cOlllllUnication "y"tam. (Sinale failure allowed to block all audio communication!) 
DAAS provide. 3 leparate IYlt ... po.aible to connect to the pilot or copilot headaet or apeakera via re-
dundant Iwitchea on the audio panel. Very good redundancy. OK. 
Switch NAV 1 SEL Stuck in 4 
one pOlition 
NAV 2 SEL "4 
IIIE SEL 4 
VOR SEL RMI 4 
LOC IGS SEL ADI 4 
NAV-CPU Only one of manual or OMS 
NAVl - DCElV control available. 
NAV-CPU 
NAV2-DCEIV 
NAV-CPU Only one of NAV 1, 2, or 
IIIE RECEIV OMS control available 
NAV 1.2 RECEIV Only VOR 1 or 2 or none of 
IMI VOR 1,2 avail. on RMI 
Radio adpt. Only LOC IGS info. from 
box ADI NAV 1 or NAV 2 or what 
MAS aelects avail. on 
ADI 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
CONCLUSION: Thne switch .. do not repre.ent o1nale point failure. in critical sinale 
channels OK. Co-pilot backup. 
IOCC keyboard & 
touch P. 
Faulty in- 50 
put. to 
IDCC 
IOCC Selector switches Faulty 40 
IDCe CPU. refresh-
memory & 
display 
mode lelactton 
Faulty 
computation 
75 
& pres en- 300 
tattoo 
IDCC, CPU 
NAV-CPU 
EIISI 
IDCC, CPU 
IDCC, CPU 
Erroneous flt. plan, flight NOIYES 
Itatu •• way pointa, map, etc. 
Wrong & not chanaeable "pagea" NO 
Wrong or garbeled info. 
dilplayed. not under-
.tendable 
YES 
BITE 
AI.umed to create a 
confu.ina lituation before 
the pilot finds out how 
a fault affect. OMS 
function. and how he hal 
to let the switche. for 
correct .y.tem operation 
Keyed in melsages di .... 
played on IDCC before 
entered. Detectable 
Not wanted mode lel-
ected & not possible 
to select deli red mode 
Pilot misses IDCC AID 
Pilot detect. the 
failure. 
OJNCLUSION: The probability of the pilot '. not detecting ''No 57 errora" 
in this re.pect! nte BITE detect. !kout 80t _gf all comput~! 
of undetected failurea from 75.4'10 • 3'10 to 0 2'3'10 
by IOCC or EHSI checko is very low Ok 
faUureo, which reducel the probability 
•• 6·10-~/4 hra. 
EHS! Selector switches Faulty 20 EHSI-CPU 
EllS I 
Wrong & not changeable modes NO Not pOSSible to select 
desired mode 
EllS 1 , CPU & BIM, 
refresh-memory 
and 
display 
mode 
selection 
Faulty 75 
computation 
and 
or acales. 
Wrona or garbled 
info. displayed 
presentation 300 -6-3 
YES 
BITE 
PUot misses EHSI info 
Fault detect possible 
by pilot. 
'rhe probability for 10 .. of EHSI 10"-'400'4'10 ·1.6'10 per 4 flt. hra. 
The pOSSibility of reconfiguration (BIM + CPU) reduceo the probability to 4'325'10-6 • 1.3'10-3 a .. uming 100% 
BITE coverage. 
I-> 
~ 
c.o 
FAILlJHL IlAAS 
fIll lJAAS LLHIEIH 110 FAILUR< 
FAILURE 
HATE*W6 
AFFECTED 
ELEMENTS 
EFFECTS OF 
FAILIlllE WAR.1 ETC 
FAILUkL 
CATlbOHY 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
Annunc ia tor 
panel & drive 
circuits 
Mode controller 
and drive cir-
euita 
Auto pilot 
yaw clutch. lervo 
CONCLUS ION. Reconfiguration of the mOlt reliable el8lDllnta doe. not improve the rl.k .ituation vgry much! The co-pilot 
NAV.-fgCiliU •• ... k .. IlAAS OK. BITE reduce. undetected computer fanure. to IS'IO- per flt. hr. or 
60'10- per flight. 
\CAP- Fault in 30 
315 penel or 
drive circ. 
Annunciator 
penel 
Kilsed or wrong mode Itatul 
info 
CONCLUSION. FAR 23.1329 requesta means to inform the pilot what AID -NAV. 
mode 18 engaged. Switch pOlitionl Ire not acceptable. MAS 
OK in thb respect. 
KHC- Faulty trim 60 
340 or hdg sel. 
knob 
Faulty tog- 180 
81e switches 
Faulty 801en- 100 
old switches 
Alp-cpu No trim/hda .. 1 avail. 
variou. pert. Trim/hdg oel activated 
of IlAAS accidentally. 
Engage not vanted mod. 
Dis.naage v.nted mode 
Not defined mode (e.g. 
ATT .. ALT) 
Accidental ensaS. or disen-
gage of Alp (Y 10) mode. 
CONCLUSION FAR 23 requirement on acce.sibility of controle met. OK 
Fault in any 70 Control lurfaee Servo not IDOvable 
hardware Servo run away clutch not 
locking clutch allw. 
locked 
NO 
NO 
NO 
Hight temp mislead 
the pilot FC and 
NAV inltrumenta will 
tell the truth, how-
ever 
The pilot override. 
and dilengagel the 
aystem 
Demanding If a mode 
change t.ke. place 
at buay part of the 
flight, or a mode jUlt 
quietly open. up 
No YID aV8il. 
Pilot override 
Disengage Y 10 
Roll Clutch. 8ervo 70 
" NO No roll Alp avail. 
Pilot override 
DhenS8se Alp. 
Pitch clutch, servo 70 
Trim clutch. aervo 50 
Clutches cOUIDon Faulty Control lur'" 
logic Circuitry fac •• 
NO 
Trim not .ove.bie Yeo 
'rim run away Trim 
..onitor 
None of the clutch.s en- NO 
gasu. All clutche. 
8 tay engaged. 
3 
3 
No pitch Alp avail. 
Pilot override. 
D100ngage AlP. 
Monitor detect a trim 
runaway. open circuit-
riea. but not motor 
failure. (e.s., only 
one direction.) 
No AlP engaged. Pilot 
mUlt override in 3 
axea. 
FAILURl FAILUKl 
AATL*luG 
AFFECTED 
IlLEllENTS 
EFFECTS OF 
FAILURE 
IJAAS FAILI.Rl 
CATtGORY Nil IJAA!> lLHlblT 1m FAILUKE WARN ETC CUI1llIlTS 
71 
72 
AlP-I/o 
COIICLUSIOII FAE 23 met regarding pouibilitiel to ov.rride. FAE 23 r.quir"""'nt on fault in only one channel not met. 
111. pIlot might end up in • critical lituatloD if one or more of the •• rvOI or of the clutch •• are not 
operaUonal. No warning or info aiven. 'lbe pilot 11 in a critical I1tuation if he haa to override 
all 3 lervol. The probability of not being able to .nga.g all clutchez ~I '" 10-4 /4 hra. The probability 
of not being able to dbengage ell clutche. 10"'" (4.5·10 )" (4·4.10- ) < 10-12 /4 hra. 
The probability of a critical o1tuation 11 negligible! OK. 
Fault in any Brroneau. 
CPU + BIM 
AID, D/A, MUX 
hardware 60 + 12 
60 
AlllOlt all 
element.! Mode Itatu. 
F/D-c_nd. 
lervo-coaaand. 
YES 
BITE 
The Alp- I/o computer 
10 a key element in 
OMS Failure effectl 
FIt warning 
cruile-perform 
fuel distance 
BITE 3 
of all cateaoriel .. y 
occur. For inatanee. 
ENERAL POSSIBLE FAILURE IllDES HIlX A D CPU MEHOItY D A HIl IDDC info 
a CPU failure may 
affect aeparate tn-
Itructiona, e.a .• hift, 
which will .poil all 11 l1~nala hiah or low 
" " zero. 
" " .. fa~lty 
" " enarate ~RnalB 
" 
" x x x 
" 
EUSI map 
Annunciator 
Error may .ffect 
only one function, 
e.I., door warn-
ing. or .... oy 
elementl, a.a. D/A 
failure coumanding 
J lerv08 hardover. 
mult. and div A 
D/A failure may cauae 
all outputl to ao hi8h, 
including all .ervol 
and ADI cClIDmoI.nd barl. 
The bite coverage 11 about 957. It 11 very likely that BITE will datec~ avan more of the levere failures. 
requested to bring the probability of an undetected failure down to 10- 14 hro. A BITE coverage of 99 97. 11 
NAV FLT/pLAN 
CPU 6. BIM 
CONCLUSION: FAR 23 requir_nt on disengagement and pouibility to override 11 met. (The added lG-dump-Bwitch is helpful). 
FAR 23 requirement on only sinale axix hardover failure i. violated. It is probable that failures occur which, 
detected or not by the BITE, will cause tranlientl and ahut down major parts of the OMS. The DAAS co ... pllot 
will, in such situation., take over and DMS will be disengaaed. 
Actions to relolve the FAR conflict is recoumended. 
Fault in 
any hard-
ware 
CONCLUSION 
60 + 12 Alp COllllll. bars 
Alp lervol 
ERSI 
IDCC 
NAV I, 2 
BUBBLE IIEK. 
ErroD CODID. referencel 
Faulty map 
Faulty NAV info 
Wrong frequencies 
Store faulty NAVAID 
data 
YES 
BITE 
Undetected erroneOU8 
NAV cOUIputat ions may, 
during a fairly long 
tae, introduce Ale 
position errors Several 
indicatora may give con'" 
8iatently faulty info 
Los. of NAVAID after a 
detected fault may allo 
bring problema to an 
unexperienced pilot 
The probability of faulty NAV calculationl isn.l4.72 10-6,oJ 3.10-4 without reconfi8uration 
The probability of faulty NAV calculations is'" 4.72.10-60-1&) + (4 72.10-6)2 • (l-~O)"" 10-4 with reconfiguration 
Reconfiguration improve. the availability of the NAV calculation. 5 timea. Significant improvement I requirel 
better BITE coverage. 
OMS with co-pilot OK 
..... 
C,J1 
..... 
~AlluKl 
NO Utll\~ Lll-IIL-IT 
73 SPARE CPU & BIH 
74 
75 
76 
77 
Radio Adapter 
BOl[ & BIH 
DABS -
CPU + BIM 
Panel 
Transponder 
Bu. controller 
and reconfig 
CPU + 81H 
488 Bus 
11\.1 FAlllJK[ 
Fault in 60 + 12 
any parts 
AFFECTED 
ELEMENTS 
EFFECTS OF 
FAILURE 
uAA~ 
IIAH" lTe 
EllSI or by Same failure effect a as fault YES 
NAV computer 61 EIISI, CPU, and 72 NAV CPU. BITE 
controlled 
elements 
FAlllJHl 
tATlGUKY 
Similar to faulta 
No 61 and 72. 
CONCLUSION The likelihood that any spare CPU or BIH failure will affect the IlAAS performance is negligible. 
failurea are r!3uired, the 1'~obabilitr7for thil is (NAV. FAIL + EHSI FAIL) • (SPARE FAIL) or 
(72 + 72)·4·10 • (72·4·10 ) ...... 2·10 • 
Because 2 81milar 
KIlC 
The apare CPU itself will not harm the IlAAS: 
Fault in 40 + 12 
any part 
ERSI 
IDCC 
AlP (ADI) 
Hiltuna NAV/DHE receiv. 
Garble NAV data to NAV 
AlP CPU, which may affect 
visual indicator. and buga 
.. well Alp a.rvo •• 
YES 
BITE 
COIICLUSION The co-pilot backup NAV instrumentation make. IlAAS OK. 
Any part 60 + 12 
failure 
IDCC No identification poasible 
Hial.ading IDCC info 
preaenUd to the 1 pilot 
YES 
BITE 
CONCLUSION SEE ALSO FAULT NO. 50 KT-76A TRANSPONDER • 
DABS NOT FULLY DEFINED. 
Any part 60 + 12 
failure 
Faults in 
wires or con-
nectors 
All IlAAS 
computers & 
functions 
Power up mode. One or more YES 
fault. in one or more of the BITE 
CPU'. when loading the pro-
gr .... 
Normal Hode 
1. Hilinterpretation of validity 
lilnal. and .hutdown of fault-
free CPU, 
2. Ho warn. given for 801De BUS-CPU and 
IDCC-CPU fa ilurea. 
3. Bu. control failures may result 
ln al.sed information or com-
plete bua traffic breakdown 
Reconfiguration Hode 
Tha CPU may faU to recon-
fillure. 
EQUAL TO BUS CONTROL FAILURES NO. 76 
CONCLUSION: Failure. in the bua controller may affect IOCr. than 1 channel. 
The IlAAS co-pilot provide. backup, making IlAAS OK. 
The faIlure effecta are 
dependent on engaged model, 
e g during a coupled 
land ing the IlAAS may con-
trol all indicators (ncept 
the RHI) aa well .. the 
AlP .ervo. and ADI buga. 
No readable output. 
Traffic control takes 
proper action 
TheBe failures are 
expected to be 
detected by BITE 
or the pilot. 
TheBe failures might result 
in a demanding Bituation if 
they occur during a bUB, 
flight pha ••• 
LOBI of most of the DAAS 
function. in a bUly flillht 
phaae is demand lng. 
Reault. in lOll of ERSI 
or NAV computer. 
FAILlJRl 
'IU 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
UAAS £LUllilT 
Bubble Hem 
Cassette 
Alternator 
(Batt ) 
28VDC bus 
Avionics bus 
28 VDC 
IlAAS A and B 
28 VDC bus 
DAA, bus 115 
and 26 VAt 
FAILUR[ AFFECTED 
,1O FAILURl RATE"IUb ELEMENTS 
Any part 300 All Ilo\AS 
failure computers 
and func-
tions 
EFFECTS OF 
FAlLURE 
UAAS 
WAR" LTC 
All kind. of failures might YES. Hem 
occur from. sinale instruction sum checka 
failure to all CPU instructions in the CPU·. 
faulty. 
FA I LlJlll 
LATlbORY 
A fault happening before 
flight will be detected 
by the mem sum. check 
or by the pilot before 
takeoff. A failure dur-
ing flight followed by a 
temp power 108. may, in 
a worse cale. mean 10s8 
of the IlAAS. 
CONCLUSION. Failures affecting more than 1 channel may happen, FAR 23 violation. 'l1le moat levere failure 
is bubble memory failure 1n air, followed by a temporary power 10.8 during a demanding ghase 6 
of the flight The probability for this to happen is estimated at le .. than (300'4.10- ) x (50.4.10- ) ...... 2 
The probability for critical failure. to occur due to the bubble memory is low enough to make IlAAS OK. 
Action is recommended to resolve the FAR conflict. 
Any part 500 
failure 
Bubble memory 'nle failure effects are limilar 
to bubble memory failures. 
YES 
CPU mem. 
3 A fault will be detected 
before flight. 
CONCLUSION. Cassette 
S\DD check 
failure. will very likely b~6detected by BIT or the pilot before takeoff. 
failure is judged to be C10 • IlAAS OK 
'nle probability of an undetected 
e.l.ette 
Alternators, ,.., 1 
Battary, bUB 
failures 
All electrical Shut. down all major IlAAS 
unite except lensors 
DAAS-buseB 
Obvious 4 
CONCLUSION No FAR 23 or 91 requirements on avionics elf power bus redundancy or failure probability 
Very critical situation 
It is assumed that the pilot qUickly disengages a faulty A/C battery if it fail. when any alternator is OK 
The probability...( of 10 .. Of the 28 VDC bu. during 4 !6t~ hrs. is thu~6 -6 -6 
.-(, ....... Alt. A x..{ Alt. B x~Batt +-1buslV(200'4'10 ) x (l00 410 ) + .1'10 tV 110 
NOTE The battery will be drained in le •• than 1 fit. hr. (Before the battery is drained, the probability of 
open or shorted bus is the most likely reason for electrical power lOIs). 
Connection. , 
switches bus r-JI 
Audio NAV, 
DHE. X-ponder, 
etc 
Loss of cOUlDunlcation. NO 4 
CONCLUSION The reduncant line8 and switches make the avionics bu. 81 aafe 81 the alternator 28VOC bus 
(Pilot and co-pilot instrumentation electrical power should, in principal, be separated.) 
Connections, 1V.5 
switches, 
diods, battery, 
buses 
DAAS CPU'. 
memories. 
EIISI, IDCC, 
FeS, etc 
Shuts down DAAS YES 
BITE 
CONCLUSION IlAAS with co-pilot, demanding 3. Still low probability of electrical power 1088! 
Lines. lO 
switches, 
converters 
DIR & vert gyro Errors or no attitude refer- YES 
ADJ, RKI. ADC ences, etc "VALIDITY" 
81gn condit 
CONCLUSION Los. of OMS-AC judged OK 
Affects both the pilot 
and co-pilot cODlnun NAV 
equipment 
Reliability degradation 
is due to single switches 
and lines 
FAIL~HL 
NO 
84 
85 
86 
ADDITION 
1J1IiI~ lLLllulT 
DAAS 15VDC 
DAAS 12VDC 
DAAS 5VDC 
DAAS Soft-
ware 
~AIL~Hl AFFECTED EFFECTS OF OAAS 
Illl FAILUKl RAn"lOb ELEMENTS FAILURE WARN HC 
Lines 15 ANALOG I/O Host senIor inputs missing. YES 
switches BITE 
inverter 
18 Bubble Hem. Reconfiguration not possible. NO 
15 IDCC Shut down of DAAS Obvious 
CPU's 
CONCLUSION Failures 84 and 86 can be accepted in DAAS due to the co-pilot backup. 
ALL CPU's 
FAR 23 is not met for electrical 
Act ions are recOIIIDended. 
unknown AlP. lervos. 
EllS!, IDCe, etc. 
power fanures 82 to 86. 
Any type of erroneous COIIID. NO 
and infonu.tton. 
CONCLUSION. The DAAS co-pilot will take over and DAAS will be disengaged. OK. 
FAILURl 
CIITll.UKY 
3 
Probability of 
reconfiguration low 
End of Document 
